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THE OPTION CONUNDRUM IN TAX LAW: 
AFTER ALL THESE YEARS, WHAT EXACTLY IS AN OPTION?
Kevin Liss
Some of the latest financial products that have become prevalent on Wall 
Street defy easy categorization for tax purposes.  Certain products, such as 
economic derivatives or weather derivatives, bear the trappings of options, but lack 
an underlying property component.  Other products, such as credit default swaps, 
have option-type payouts, but are cast in the form of financial swaps.  Which of these 
products are truly options and why?  When and how to tax these instruments 
depends on proper resolution of this fundamental classification issue.  
Unfortunately, however, the essential nature of what truly constitutes an option is 
found nowhere in the tax law and has eluded generations of tax commentators.  With 
respect to credit default swaps, arguably the single most important product 
innovation on Wall Street in the last 20 years, hundreds of millions of dollars in 
potential withholding tax liability (on cross-border swap payments) are riding on a 
resolution of this issue.
This pathbreaking article, focusing on what exactly makes an option an 
option, is both timely and exceedingly relevant.  It tackles a longstanding 
philosophical question which has modern-day resonance in the ongoing debate over 
the appropriate taxation of the latest generation of financial products.  Relying on 
contract-law principles and economic risk analysis, the article revisits longstanding 
case law to fashion a modern-day definition for what constitutes an option.  In the 
process, it reassesses some of the leading cases on options based on this new 
understanding.  Ultimately, it resolves the question of whether the concept of an 
option properly encompasses non-property-based options, such as economic or 
weather derivatives, as well as contingent options, such as credit default swaps.  
As a coda to the pursuit of a new framework for defining options, the article 
concludes by proposing a basis for differentiating between options, properly 
understood, and financial swaps, two product categories which up to now have had 
overlapping reach, allowing taxpayers to avoid undesired tax results by the simple 
expedient of selecting the desired form of transaction.  While the article’s suggested 
approach would deprive taxpayers of the flexibility inherent in current law’s 
ambiguity, this flexibility conflicts with the government’s asserted interest in promoting 
neutrality in the taxation of financial products.  Equally important, the financial 
products sector is more likely to thrive when uncertainties in the taxation of 
economically useful transaction are satisfactorily resolved.
INTRODUCTION
An option is typically described as a contract between two parties 
that provides one party the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an 
underlying stock or other asset at a set price and date.  In fact, most option 
contracts are explicitly labeled as such, with the contract by its terms 
providing one party the choice of whether or not to perform its side of the 
contract in exchange for an option premium.  Sometimes, however, 
contracts not labeled as options may bear some economic resemblance to 
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options, making it difficult to ascertain whether the parties have entered 
into some kind of financial swap, a conventional purchase and sale 
agreement, or whether the contract is more in the nature of an option.  
Alternatively, a contract may be styled as an option, and bear the option 
label and terminology, even though it does not by its literal terms provide 
a right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a set price and date.  In these 
situations, proper characterization of the contract depends upon being able 
to precisely identify the essential elements of an option.  
Both of these challenges have arisen in the financial product sector 
in recent years, as Wall Street has churned out a whole host of new option-
like financial products that defy easy categorization for federal income tax 
purposes.  The likes of these products is so exotically different from 
traditional option products that tax professionals have seemingly tied 
themselves into Gordian knots trying to classify them.  As it happens, two 
of the earliest such products, namely catastrophe options and weather 
derivatives, have either fizzled out (catastrophe options) or have enjoyed 
relatively modest growth (weather derivatives).1  While the income 
taxation of these products has yet to be fully resolved, the financial world 
has not exactly been standing still waiting for closure from the tax realm.  
Most recently, investment banking firms have been unveiling a wide array 
of so-called economic derivatives, which offer cash-settled options on 
various categories of published economic data, such as fluctuations in gas 
storage inventories or unemployment figures, and accordingly give rise to 
similar concerns.   
All of the aforementioned products are cast in the form of options, 
but because there is no underlying property interest, commentators have 
questioned whether they should truly be respected as options for tax 
purposes.2  Another modern-day option-type product, known as a credit 
default swap, suffers from the opposite problem.  Although it is not styled 
as an option, a credit default swap has option-like features.  However, 
because this product requires resolution of a contingency prior to paying 
off, some commentators have raised questions as to whether such a 
contingent product can truly qualify as an option.3
In terms of its importance to the financial world, the credit default 
swap looms much larger than all the preceding product categories 
combined.  According to the latest data, the volume of outstanding credit 
1
 The total volume of weather derivatives transactions in 2004 was $8.4 billion, 
according to the Weather Risk Management Association.  www.wmra.org.
2 See, e.g., Thomas Humphreys, Gambling on Uncertainty – The Federal Income Tax 
Treatment of Weather Swaps, CAT Options, and Some Other New Derivatives (Nov. 2, 
1998) (Tax Forum No. 528).
3
 See, e.g., Matthew Stevens, The Tax Treatment of Contingent Options, Tax Notes 525 
(Jan. 26, 2004)(Example 4)
. 
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derivatives in the first half of 2005 exceeded $12.4 trillion. This represents 
a year-on-year growth rate of 128% from $5.44 trillion at mid-year 2004.4
While the market for the other new products is still relatively young, credit 
derivatives have clearly become an integral part of the financial market.  
Obviously, we have reached a point at which attention must be paid.  
The international or cross-border arena stands at the epicenter of 
the tax world’s concern, since knowing whether or not a credit derivatives 
product is truly an option or not has important withholding tax 
consequences.  Simply put, it is imperative that contracting parties know 
whether the product is a bona fide option, in which case cross-border 
payments may be made on a tax-free basis,5 or whether the product might 
be better characterized as some other category of financial product, such 
as a guarantee or insurance, that might be fully subject to dreaded 
withholding or insurance excise taxes.6  In the ever burgeoning credit 
derivatives market, hundreds of millions of dollars are riding on a 
favorable resolution of this question.  For this reason, knowing how credit 
default swaps should be classified may be the single most important topic 
confronting the tax world today.7
4 ISDA’s 2005 Mid-Year Market Survey, available at http://www.isda.org.
5
 Credit derivatives would also avoid withholding tax if they could be classified as 
“notional principal contracts.” Withholding tax under that classification would be 
avoided because the regulations source such payments at the residence of the recipient.
Treasury Regulation § 1.863-7(b).  See also Treasury Regulation § 1.1441-4(a)(3) 
(generally no withholding on notional principal contracts). Leading commentators have 
urged this approach.  See, e.g., Gregory May and Robert Scarborough, Attorneys Advise 
Against Issuing Further Guidance on Credit Default Swaps (Oct. 1, 2002), 2002 TNT 
226-21 (hereinafter "May and Scarborough"); David Nirenberg and Stephen. Kopp, Tax 
Treatment of Total Return Swaps, Default Swaps and Credit Linked Notes, 87 J. Tax’n
82 (August 1997). In truth, however, neither one of these product categorizations 
unambiguously fit these new financial products.  With respect to the option analysis, 
substantial doubts have been expressed as to whether a contingent option can truly be 
regarded as an option for tax purposes.  Doubts have also been expressed as to whether 
these products truly satisfy the definition of notional principal contracts or whether they 
sufficiently resemble them economically.  These issues are discussed more fully in Part V 
below.   
6 Bruce Kayle, Will the Real Lender Please Stand Up? The Federal Income Tax 
Treatment of Credit Derivative Transactions, 50 Tax Lawyer 561 (1997), (suggesting that 
a CDS may be more analogous to a guarantee or letter of credit).
7
 In Notice 2004- 52, 2004-32 IRB 168, the IRS launched a project to characterize and 
determine the tax treatment of credit derivatives.  A number of practitioners have 
weighed in with commentaries on the proper treatment of these products.  See, e.g., ISDA 
Comments, 2003 TNT 232-17; Jonathan Talisman and Joseph Mikrut, Writers Make 
Second Request for Guidance on Credit Default Swaps (July 02, 2002), 2002 TNT 148-
34; May and Scarborough, note 5; David Garlock, Harold Leventhal and Alan Munro, 
E&Y Comments on Tax Treatment of Credit Default Swaps 2005 TNT 16-21; New York 
CPA Group Comments On Credit Default Swap Rules. 2005 TNT 215-12, November 7, 
2005); New York State Bar Association, Report on Credit Default Swaps (September 9, 
2005) (NYSBA 2005 CDS Report) available on NYSBA’s website at 
http://www.nysba.org/taxreports/ .
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Unfortunately, there is precious little guidance on just what makes 
an option an option for tax purposes.8  Usually, an option is defined as an 
agreement whereby one party pays the other a premium in exchange for 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell property. This deceptively 
simple and straightforward definition masks a whole host of important 
questions.  What elements are really necessary to cause an economic 
arrangement to be treated as an option for federal income tax purposes? Is 
it really essential for a premium to be paid in exchange for an option, and 
to the extent that it is, must it necessarily be paid upfront?  Is an option 
still an option if the premium is payable on the exercise date, rather than 
when the contract is executed?  Is an underlying property really a 
necessary element for the existence of an option?  Does a non-property 
based option still qualify as an option?  If so, how does a non-property-
based option differ from a wager?  What if an option contract is subject to 
a contingency?  Does the contingency obviate the essential nature of an 
option contract as an option?   How is it possible to differentiate between 
an option and a financial swap?  For all the apparent clarity subsumed in 
the traditional definition of an option, there is little authority on these 
underlying questions, and yet the question of what constitutes an option is 
of vital importance to the financial product sector.  The purpose of this 
paper is to develop an appropriate standard for ascertaining whether a 
product should be treated as an option for tax purposes, and, ultimately, to 
apply that standard to the latest generation of financial products.9
I. OVERVIEW OF NEW FINANCIAL PRODUCTS
8
 The absence is not for want of trying.  There have in fact been several good articles on 
the nature of options.  See, e.g., Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-
So-Clear Reflection of Income from an Option to Acquire Property, 48 Tax Law Rev. 
233 (Winter 1993); Humphreys, note.2; Stevens, note 3. 
9This article addresses only standalone options, in which the option element is 
transaction-determinative, in contrast with secondary or embedded options that are an 
incidental part of a larger bilateral executory contract. Bilateral contracts typically entail 
a bundle of rights and obligations, and as such they commonly address contingencies that 
may provide for alternative paths through embedded options.  For instance, the pre-
payment option in a home mortgage is designed to deal with an unanticipated home sale.  
An auto lease might allow customers to terminate the lease early and return their car in 
the first 12,000 miles for any reason, without incurring any penalty.  Loan agreements 
typically contain covenants that allow the bank to take action when a borrower's default 
risk increases.  Each of these provisions constitutes a mechanism for dealing with 
unspecified contingencies, and as such are analogous to options. Generally, these options 
are incidental to a larger transaction (i.e., a mortgage, a lease, or a loan), they are not 
easily severed, and may be difficult to separately value.   Accordingly, they are outside 
the scope of this article. 
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A. Credit Default Swaps
Before delving into the relevant authorities on options, it is 
worthwhile to reflect more fully on the latest generation of financial 
products whose classification for tax purposes has been subject to 
continuing doubts. 
The most important category, credit default swaps (“CDSs”), are 
option-type derivative products that allow market participants to put a 
price on, and thereby transfer to a counterparty, third-party credit risk. 
Although these products have payout terms reminiscent of options, they 
generally are not cast as options in form.  In the simplest form of CDS, 
one party (often referred to as the credit protection buyer) makes either a 
single lump sum payment or a series of periodic payments that are based 
on a notional principal amount, in exchange for a contingent payment 
from the other party (the credit protection seller) that is triggered solely 
upon the happening of a "credit event" regarding a reference obligor, i.e., a 
specified company that has outstanding indebtedness.10 The happening of 
a defined credit event and the calculation of the settlement amount due 
from the seller are determined by reference to objective financial 
information.  A credit event can be a default on any obligation of the third
party obligor (a reference obligation) or some other specified event that 
indicates a decline in the creditworthiness of the third party. 
If there is no credit event, the product simply expires worthless.  If 
there is a credit event, the credit protection buyer must pay the credit 
protection seller for the decline in value of the reference obligation.  The 
terms of payout very from product to product, but in general, a CDS may 
be either cash-settled or physically settled.  If settled in cash, the 
protection seller generally will pay the buyer an amount equal to the 
excess of the notional principal amount of the CDS over the reference 
obligation's post-credit event fair market value or, in some cases, a 
predetermined fixed amount.   If settled physically, the protection buyer 
delivers to the protection seller a “deliverable obligation”11 and receives 
the par amount of that deliverable obligation. It is not necessary for the 
credit protection buyer to actually own a deliverable obligation of the third
party obligor; if physical settlement is provided for, the protection buyer 
should be able to purchase one in the marketplace if need be.
B. Non-Property Based Options
10
 In more complex forms, referred to as basket products, the product may reference 
multiple obligors.
11
“Deliverable obligations" are specified types of obligations of the reference entity 
that may be tendered, and which are generally expected to approximate the post-credit 
event value of the reference obligations. 
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Unlike the credit default swap, all of the other product categories 
described in the Introduction are actually styled as options, but they differ 
from conventional options insofar as they lack an underlying property.  
Product categories fitting this description include catastrophe options, 
weather derivatives, prepayment derivatives, storage derivatives, and 
economic derivatives.  
Catastrophe Options. One of the oldest and perhaps best-known 
products of this genre, catastrophe options, or CAT options,12 gave the 
holder, in exchange for an upfront option premium, a specified cash 
payment if and when an index that m easured insurance industry 
catastrophe losses exceeded a certain level.  If the index failed to reach 
that threshold, the option expired worthless, and the seller kept the 
premium.  Payout might be tied to an earthquake reaching 7.0 or higher in 
moment magnitude, a measure of earthquake intensity similar to the more 
commonly known Richter scale.  These options were used mainly by 
insurance companies to hedge catastrophe risk.  
Weather Derivatives. Weather derivatives, which have enjoyed 
steady growth since their introduction in the late 1990’s, employ a 
weather-related construct as the basis for determining payouts under 
financial contracts that are styled as either cash-settled options contracts or 
swaps.  These products are generally tied to an index measuring some
aspect of the climate, such as temperature, precipitation, or wind speed.  
To date, most contracts have been temperature-related, so- called “degree-
day options” which have payouts that are linked to the extent to which 
daily average temperatures rises or falls below a benchmark temperature 
of 65° Fahrenheit.  These instruments require days of the month to be 
classified as either cooling degree days (“CDD’s) or heating degree days 
(“HDD’s), depending on whether the average of the highest and lowest 
temperature during a particular day at a specified weather station exceeds, 
or falls short of, 65 degrees Fahrenheit.13  A particular contract specifies a 
fixed number of such cooling degree days (or heating degree days) as the 
strike price, and if during the relevant period the number of such days 
exceeds the number fixed in the contract, the option pays out.14
12
 CAT options were ultimately delisted by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in the 
year 2000 due to lack of trading volumes.  
13
 More precisely, cooling and heating degree-days are defined as follows :
Daily CDD = max (daily average temperature – 65° Fahrenheit, 0)
Daily HDD = max (65° Fahrenheit – daily average temperature, 0)
14
 A CDD season generally runs from May to September, and HDD season runs from 
November to March.  The final settlement price is defined by the HDD or CDD 
(cumulative) index of the contract month for a specified city as calculated by Earth 
Satellite Corporation (Earth Sat), an international service firm.   The products are 
available on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or as privately negotiated weather 
derivatives, which are typically documented under a master agreement such as the ISDA 
Weather Swap Confirmation.
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Otherwise, the options expire worthless.  Since HDD’s and CDD’s are not 
currency units, they must be translated into dollars under the terms of each 
contract.  Thus, payoff should equal the number of such excess days 
multiplied by a specified notional amount.  
Economic Derivatives. Options on economic statistics constitute a 
whole new class of options that reference various real economic data 
releases.  The derivatives are bought and sold in Dutch auctions15 prior to 
the public release of the relevant economic data, with the options settling 
according to the release.  The options pay the difference between the 
selected strike price and the actual outcome.
Mortgage Prepayment Derivatives.  Similarly, mortgage 
prepayment derivatives, another new type of option that is traded through 
monthly auctions, have payoffs dependent upon the prepayment speeds of 
mortgage backed securities. In particular, payout is determined by 
reference to the realized monthly conditional prepayment rate (“CPR”) of 
the benchmark FNMA 30-year mortgagee-backed securities (“MBS”) 
issued in a specific year.   
Storage Options.  Options on gas storage contracts, known as 
inventory options, are cash-settled options on the weekly natural gas 
storage number released by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
of the U.S. Department of Energy.  The auction, which takes place a day 
ahead of the weekly release of the gas storage number, gives traders an 
opportunity to buy and sell options that pay off, or not, depending on 
where the storage number comes out.  The weekly change in the 
inventories determines which options are in-the-money and which are out-
of-the-money.   The strike units of the options is the number of billions of 
cubic feet of natural gas or millions of barrels of oil that could potentially 
be the difference in inventory from the previous week’s report.  
All of the aforementioned options resemble ordinary options in 
virtually all respects, save for the presence of an underlying property.  As 
in the case of conventional options, participants are able to go long or 
short the statistic using call and put options.  Investors can choose from a 
range of strike prices, and payout profiles conform to standard option 
conventions.   In the case of so-called vanilla options, payoff is determined 
based on the difference between the relevant strike price and the actual 
data release.  Call (put) options expire worthless if settlement is below 
(above) the option strike.  Digital options are binary options which either 
expire worthless, or pay a specified dollar amount regardless of how much 
15
 Dutch auctions enable liquid markets to develop in the absence of an underlying 
instrument.   In a Dutch auction, option prices are determined by the market, based on the 
relative demand for outcomes among all market participants.  
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in-the-money the option settles.  Options are generally booked and settled 
as standard over-the-counter derivatives documented through ISDA 
agreements.
Whether or not any of the aforementioned products truly 
constitutes an option depends on one’s ability to identify the essential 
elements of an option, which as noted is famously lacking under current 
law.  In the case of non-property options, does any product that is cast in 
the form of an option automatically qualify for the benefits of options 
taxation? With respect to credit default swaps, the operative question is 
whether contingent options truly qualify as options for tax purposes.
These questions will be taken up in Parts III and IV below.   
C. Option Ambivalence
Before proceeding down these respective paths of inquiry, it bears 
some acknowledgement that tax professionals have long been ambivalent 
about the tax regime governing options, with many leading practitioners 
openly questioning whether the historical regime really gets it right.16
Options are subject to a unique set of tax rules, making them somewhat of 
an anomaly in the tax realm.  For example, upfront payments for options 
are not subject to immediate taxation, nor, for that matter, are they 
required to be taken into income until the time of exercise.  The option 
holder, for its part, is not allowed to deduct or amortize option premiums.  
In the case of credit default swaps, leading practitioners are ambivalent 
about option characterization; it would result in satisfactory results for 
withholding tax purposes, but less than optimal results on issues of timing 
and character.
Whether or not the longstanding rules for taxation of options are 
correct, it is important to ascertain in the first instance the true nature of 
these latest financial instruments.  If it turns out, after careful reflection, 
that these products are not options, contrary to what is argued here, it may 
well be that they merit their own sui generis method of taxation after all.  
However, before undertaking that approach, it behooves us to first see if it 
is possible to rule out any of the existing financial categories.  In order to 
16 See, e.g., New York State Bar Association, Report on Timing and Character Rules for 
Prepaid Forwards and Options (2001); David Weisbach, Colloquium on Financial 
Instruments: Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 491 
(1995); Kayle, note 8. Noel Cunningham & Deborah Schenk, Taxation with Realization,: 
A Revolutionary Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L.Rev. 725 (1992); Reed Shuldiner,
General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments,  71 Tex. L. Rev. 24, 
(December, 1992).
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undertake that task, it is important to properly identify what qualities truly 
make a product an option.  The premise of this article is that once we have 
properly identified an option’s crucial characteristics, we should be able to 
conclude that these products are in fact options properly speaking, 
obviating the need for a separate new financial product category.  
Having introduced some of the new financial products, the next 
order of business, then, is to thoroughly vet the relevant case law for 
guidance as to what elements are essential to the existence of an option, 
which is the topic of the immediately following section.  In reviewing the 
relevant case law, the objective is to derive and substantiate as a matter of 
law a sufficiently workable definition for what constitutes an option 
against which the various new kinds of financial products may be 
analyzed.  The operating premise of this paper is that unless we can first 
identify what an option truly is for tax purposes, there seems little basis 
upon which to conclude whether or not any of these specific financial 
products should properly be treated as options for tax purposes.  
II. IN SEARCH OF A COMMON LAW DEFINITION OF AN 
OPTION
A. Economic Rationale For Option Premiums
Although the term option is used in various Internal Revenue Code 
(“Code”) sections17 and is prominently featured in various sets of 
attribution rules,18 neither the Code nor the regulations define the term 
“option.”  Cases involving a determination of whether or not a contract is 
an option usually cast the definition in terms of contract law notions of 
offer and acceptance.  The primary legal effect of an option, according to 
these cases, is that it limits the promisor’s ability to revoke his or her offer, 
creating, in effect, an unconditional power of acceptance in the offeree.19 .  
This definition appears to closely track the definition of options found in 
contract law treatises and Restatements of Law.20
17
 See, e.g.., Secs. 318(a)(4); 1032, 1233, 1234, 1236.
18
 See, e.g. Sec.318(a)(4), Sec. 958, regarding the definition of controlled foreign 
corporation; Sec. 1297(a)(4), regarding the attribution of stock in a PFIC; Sec. 
1563(e)(1), regarding the definition of controlled group of corporations; and Sec. 382, 
regarding a change in ownership. 
19
 See, e.g. Saviano v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 955 (1983) (An option contract has two 
elements: (1) a continuing offer to do an act, or to forbear from doing an act, which does 
not ripen into a contract until it is accepted; and (2) an agreement to leave the offer open 
for a specified period of time.)  See also, Old Harbor Native Corp. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 
191, 201 (1995); Koch v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 71, 82 (1976); Carter v. Comm’r 36 T.C. 128, 
130 (1961); Drake v. Comm’r, 3 T.C 33, 37 (1944). 
20 1 Williston on Contracts §§ 5:15 and 5:16 (4th ed. 2004) describes an option as a 
unilateral contract which binds the optionee to do nothing but grants him the right to 
accept or reject the offer in accordance with its terms.  The Restatement, Contracts 2d, 
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 10
10
This formulation of the option definition recognizes that an option 
is fundamentally a contract that is antecedent to some other, more 
fundamental transaction. Buyers in effect pay a non-refundable amount in 
return for time to decide whether or not to conclude an underlying 
transaction.  This oft-cited definition at least has the virtue of suggesting 
why parties enter into options in the first place and the reason why options 
call for the payment of a premium by the option holder.  After all, parties 
in the midst of negotiations normally have the right to withdraw an offer 
prior to its acceptance, and an offer that is irrevocably left open for a 
period of time has real value to the other party.  As such, it is something 
that must be paid for in order for the “free option” to be legally binding.  
In short, some consideration is required to be paid in order to induce the 
other side to relinquish a valuable legal right – the discretionary right to 
take back an ill-considered offer.21
The case law emphasizes the significance of free choice on the part 
of the option holder to proceed with the underlying transaction, especially 
in juxtaposition to the corresponding absence of free choice on the part of 
the option writer.  According to the Claims Court in United States Freight 
Co. v. United States, an option gives rise to an irrevocable offer on the part 
of the owner of the underlying property, obliging it to comply, come what 
may, while at the same time granting the purchaser a choice of whether or 
not to buy the property at the specified price within the time specified in 
the contract. In short, it imposes on the option holder no obligation to 
consummate the transaction, allowing it the choice of exercising the 
option and performing or allowing the option to lapse.22  In that respect, an 
option is a contract in which obligations of the parties to perform their 
respective sides are not symmetrical.23
In order for the option holder’s choice of performance to be 
meaningful, the contract by its terms must limit its liability for damages 
for failing or refusing to perform, in contrast to the option writer whose 
liability is not so limited.   As a practical matter, free choice is typically 
Sec. 25(d) defines an option contract as a promise which meets the requirements for the 
formation of a contract and limits the promisor’s power to revoke an offer.
21
 Assuming that it encompasses the basic requirements of a valid contract, including 
mutual assent, consideration, legality of subject matter, and compliance with the statue of 
frauds, an option contract is an enforceable contract under applicable state law.  
22 422 F.2d 887, 894-895 (1970).
23 See, e.g., Saunders v. United States, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971) (An option is 
limited to unilateral agreements which inflexibly bind the owner of property, but not the 
counterparty.); See also,  Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71, 82 (1976)(the clear 
distinction between an option and a contract of sale is that an option gives a person a 
right to purchase at a fixed price within a limited period of time but imposes no 
obligation on the person to do so, whereas a contract of sale contains mutual and 
reciprocal obligations, the seller being obligated to sell and the purchaser being obligated 
to buy).
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 11
11
achieved through the mechanism of requiring the holder to pay an 
acceptably low upfront option premium at the inception of the contract, 
while absolving the option holder from any further liability if he is 
subsequently unable or unwilling to pay the full purchase price. 
B. Capped Liability and Free Choice
Normally, option premiums are separately stated in the option 
agreement, and the contract relieves the option holder from any obligation
to pay liquidated or any other damages to the writer for failing or refusing 
to perform.  If the option is not exercised, the writer becomes entitled to 
keep only the amount paid as consideration for granting the option and has 
no enforceable right of action against the option holder for damages.24 In 
that respect, an option premium bears some economic resemblance to a 
liquidated damages clause in a regular bilateral contract, because it sets the 
maximum liability exposure of the option holder to the option writer for 
non-performance.  In fact, an option premium may be viewed as a special 
category of liquidated damages provision, albeit one that typically calls for 
payment in advance.  Holders who choose not to consummate a 
transaction by declining exercise of the option bear only the cost of a pre-
determined (and generally, previously paid) amount which may bear no 
relation to the damages that might otherwise arise if they were calculated 
as of the exercise (or closing) date.  As the Tax Court explained in Estate 
of Franklin v. Commissioner,25 an agreement not styled as an option may 
constitute an option if its provisions enable the “purchaser” to withdraw 
from the agreement without incurring any additional liability”
In contrast, the option writer’s potential damages for non-
performance would not ordinarily be so limited.  The writer is generally 
held fully liable for any damages for its non-performance, measured on or 
after the time of exercise.26 One of the trademark features of an option, 
therefore, is an executory contract which has, implicitly or explicitly, 
unbalanced or uneven liquidated damages provisions as between the two 
contracting parties.  In other words, options are contracts which tend to 
provide for sharply circumscribed damages for one party, but not the 
other.27
24 United States Freight Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d at 895. (Ct. Cl. 1970).
25
 64 T.C. 752, 767 (1975), aff’d, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976),
26
 A contract of sale imposes an enforceable obligation to pay the purchase price. 
Accordingly, the purchaser in a bilateral contract is liable for full contract damages if she 
fails to perform. United States Freight Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d at 895. (Ct. Cl. 
1970).
27
 If an option is not exercised, the option holder becomes entitled to keep only the 
amount paid as consideration for granting the option and has no enforceable right of 
action against the optionee for damages.  Id. at 895. A contract of sale, in contrast, carries 
mutual obligations on the part of the seller to sell and the buyer to buy. See W. A. Drake, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1944), affg. 3 T.C. 33 (1944); Lawler 
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In order to have a bona fide option, the amount of the option 
premium should generally be much less than the holder’s potential liability 
for non-performance in a conventional bilateral contract.  In a normal 
bilateral contract, damages are determinable after the fact, based on the 
value of a party’s position measured as of the closing date.  By contrast, 
the amount of an option premium is determined at the inception of the 
contract, not on the exercise date, before any underlying contingencies 
have been resolved.   In fact, this distinction goes to the heart of the 
bargain that is negotiated for in an option contract.  Because the amount 
payable is determined at inception, the prospective amount of damages 
embodied by the option premium reflects only the potential value of the 
holder’s position, meaning that it is discounted by the contingency 
underlying the option.   
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that a property owner owns 
property worth $100 that has a 50% chance of appreciating in value to 
$120 and a 50% chance of declining in value to $80.28  Assume further 
that the owner writes an option to buy the property for $100, effectively 
providing for a $20 payout if the property appreciates in value, in 
exchange for a $10 upfront premium.  The option writer may be willing to 
relinquish the upside potential on the property for only $10 at the 
contract’s inception, because of the substantial doubt as to payoff, even 
though the position might be worth $20 once the contingency has been 
resolved.  By contrast, if she entered into a conventional forward sales 
contract for $100 and the property declined in value instead of 
appreciating, a putative buyer would be fully liable for $20 in damages for 
failing to perform. The “bargain” to the option holder is attributable to the 
fact that the “damages” are fixed in advance of the resolution of the 
contingency that is the basis for the option.
There is clear recognition in the case law for the notion that a 
liquidated damages provision in a bilateral contract can operate to convert 
what is formally a bilateral purchase and sale contract into an option, at 
least as long as the amount of stipulated damages is sufficiently low.  A 
common fact pattern in some of the earliest cases involves a taxpayer 
entering into a purchase and sale agreement which requires the property 
buyer to make a down payment at the time of signing, and provides for 
forfeiture of the down payment as liquidated damages in the event that the 
v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1935). The purchaser in such a bilateral 
contract is liable for full contract damages if he fails to perform. United States Freight 
Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d at 895. 
28
 Of course, in the real world, property values are not literally binary, but for any 
equilibrium price, a given property should have an equal probability of alternately 
increasing or declining in value by a given amount.  Although the potential variations in 
value are seemingly limitless, the point is that for any particular variation, the probability 
of an increase or a decrease in value by that amount should be the same.
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 13
13
buyer fails to close on the sale. The down payment in these cases clearly 
corresponds to the premium typically paid upfront on an option contract.  
In Lawler v. Commissioner,29 the issue was whether a sales 
contract which had a liquidated damages provision should really be treated 
as an option contract for tax purposes.  Lawler involved a contract for the 
subdivision and sale of a 703-acre tract of land which provided for a down 
payment to be made at the inception of the contract, and for the land to be 
deeded in trust pending a closing of the sale in a later year.  The 
classification issue was relevant to the problem of identifying the taxable 
year in which the sale should be deemed to take place for tax purposes, 
either the year of inception, or if the contract were truly an option, in a 
later year. Although the contract was not labeled an option contract, the 
court construed its provisions as amounting to an option which was 
exercised by the buyer’s act of subdividing and platting a parcel of land 
within the larger area.  In reaching that conclusion, the court honed in on 
the implications of the relevant liquidated damages provision, stating that 
The agreement also fixes the rights of the parties in a case of 
failure of the buyer to perform his obligations with diligence.  .  . .  
[It] is sufficient to say there is no provision for the payment by the 
buyer of any portion of the purchase price after the seller has 
exercised his option to terminate the contract. It is provided that all 
sums theretofore paid shall be retained by the seller as "liquidated 
damages."
Accordingly, the court held that no sale could have taken place at 
the inception of the contract, insofar as the contract was in the nature of an 
option.  
Another landmark option case, Estate of Franklin v. 
Commissioner,30 involved whether a purported sale and leaseback of a 
motel was in substance an option.  In finding that the contracts granted 
only an option to purchase the property, the court noted that a 
distinguishing characteristic of an option is that it imposes no obligation 
on the option holder to complete the transaction.  Applying this rule to the 
facts presented, the court found that neither the sales agreement nor the 
lease obligated the putative purchaser to buy the motel or pay anything in 
the way of damages if it failed to do so.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
court noted that the purchaser's liability was limited to a forfeiture of its 
rights under the sales agreement and that it was released from any further 
liability. As the court pointed out,
29
 78 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1935).
30
 64 TC 752 (1975). affd., 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
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if the partnership fails to consummate the sale, it will lose only its 
rights under the contract to buy the motel property on January 15, 
1979, at the computable price. It cannot be compelled to assume 
the mortgages or pay any other portion of the option price.
On that basis, the court concluded that the contracts essentially gave rise 
to an option, notwithstanding that the parties never literally documented 
their relationship in that fashion.
The absence of any guidance as to the true essence of what 
constitutes an option has occasionally caused courts to incorrectly treat 
certain bona fide option contracts as ordinary bilateral contracts.31
Conversely, the lack of guidance has at other times prevented courts from 
recognizing that a purportedly bilateral executory contract is in reality an 
option.  For instance, when the putative buyer in a purchase and sale 
contract fails to close on an underlying transaction, resulting in forfeiture 
of his down payment, his situation is comparable to an option holder 
whose option has lapsed, resulting in a loss of the option premium.  If the 
putative sales contract had been drawn up as an option contract, with the 
would-be buyer failing to exercise the option, the resulting loss on the 
lapse of the option premium would get capital loss treatment by virtue of 
Section 1234, which treats the lapse of an option as a sale of exchange of 
property.  The issue in the cases where there are analogous down 
payments is whether the buyer’s failure to exercise its right to purchase, 
and the concomitant forfeiture of the down payment as liquidated 
damages, similarly constitutes the sale or exchange of a capital asset.32
Harold S. Smith v. Commissioner,33 for example, involved a 
forfeited down payment in the context of a contract of sale.  The Tax 
Court in that case found the loss to be an ordinary loss, and the court of 
appeals agreed, but both courts did so without even addressing the 
potential relevance of Section 1234, the statutory option rule (or its 
predecessor, former Sec. 117(g)(2)) to the character of income (capital vs. 
ordinary) issue.  In fact, the issue of option equivalence is not mentioned 
in either one of the reported decisions. The resemblance of the contract to 
an option contract apparently escaped the notice of each of the parties as 
well as the judges of the two tribunals. Relieved of the need to 
differentiate a sales contract from an option contract, the Tax Court relied 
on a line of older decisions holding that liquidated damages received by a
seller upon the buyer's breach of a contract to purchase must be reported 
as ordinary income. In none of the cited cases, however, did the relevant 
31
 See Old Colony, discussed at length in Part IV(E)(2) below.
32
 Under the common law applicable at the time, payments in settlement of a contract 
generally gave rise to ordinary income. The case would not arise under current law, since 
sale or exchange treatment would in any event be warranted under section 1234A.
33 50 T.C. 273 (1968), aff'd, 418 F2d 573 (9th Cir. 1969).
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contracts economically resemble options, because in each of those cases 
the liquidated damages provision did not serve as the seller’s exclusive 
remedy.  In short, the contracts in question in the cited authorities did not 
in fact cap the buyer’s liability for non-performance, as would be 
necessary in order for the contract to constitute a true option.34
The option-resemblance issue was squarely addressed in U.S. 
Freight Co. v. United States,35 a case in which the IRS sought capital loss 
treatment by attempting to apply section 1234 to an option-like contract.  
The court in that case sided with the taxpayer, arguing that insofar as the 
contract in question was not by its terms an option contract, the statutory 
option rule was not literally applicable.  As the court explained,
And in the quite different situation where an option to purchase 
property expires without having been exercised, a specific 
statutory provision, section 1234(a), supplies the necessary sale or 
exchange upon which capital loss treatment depends. But in the 
case now before us, where a contract to purchase property is 
unilaterally breached by the buyer, the right to purchase being 
thereby relinquished, and the down payment is forfeited as 
liquidated damages, we perceive no sale or exchange in the 
traditional sense, nor do we understand there to be a statutory 
provision to satisfy the requirement.
The court in Freight recognized that option contracts have 
fundamentally different economic consequences compared to bilateral 
executory contracts, due to “the dissimilar rights and liabilities incident to 
each.”  As the court explained, 
The holder of an option to buy has the truly alternative choice of 
exercising the option, or allowing it to lapse. … If the option is not 
exercised, the amount paid for the option is forfeited and the 
optionor is entitled to that amount only, as the optionee was not 
obligated to perform. The purchaser in a bilateral contract with a 
liquidated damages provision, if he fails to perform, however, is 
liable for full contract damages, the liquidated contract amount 
being a measure thereof only to the extent that it is reasonably so 
related. … The compared interests do not have, as defendant 
suggests, the same economic effect. (citations omitted)
Ironically, although the court’s explanation of the difference 
between options and ordinary bilateral contracts was well-founded, the 
34
 See W. A. Drake, Inc. v. Commr, 145 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1944), affg. 3 T.C. 33 
(1944); A. M. Johnson v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 156 (1935).
35
 422 F2d 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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court’s application of the law to the facts of that case seems wrong.  In 
particular, the court rejected the argument that the liquidated damages 
provision in the contract under review operated to convert what was 
formally a bilateral purchase and sale contract into an option because it 
apparently believed that the liquidated damages remedy was not the 
seller’s exclusive remedy.  The court also appears to assume that the seller 
in fact reserved the right to enforce his full rights against the purchaser in 
lieu of claiming the amount stipulated as liquidated damages.  However, 
the facts as stated in the court’s own opinion do not bear out that 
conclusion.  The sellers in Freight had in fact agreed to relinquish their 
claims for any other damages, which would make the contract more like 
an option, based on the court’s own definition of what constitutes an 
option.  The court appears to have been influenced by the fact that the 
sellers had explicitly declined to enter into an option contract before 
entering into the sales contract.  Be that as it may, the fact that the 
resulting contract had similar economic effect to an option contract should 
have led the court to a different conclusion.  
Despite reaching the wrong result on the facts, the explanation of 
the distinction between an option contract and a bilateral sales contract in 
the Claims Court’s opinion in Freight is well-founded, and is on a par with 
the Tax Court’s expressed understanding of an option in Estate of 
Franklin.  According to the Tax Court in Franklin, a contract is an option 
if the provisions of the agreement permit the buyer to withdraw and incur 
no liability other than his initial payment.36 Putting these two cases 
together, it is possible to derive an appropriate common law litmus test for 
ascertaining whether a contract should be regarded as an option for tax 
purposes.  
In general, an option arises whenever an executory contract 
releases one party, but not the other, from liability for full contract 
damages, if that party should be unable or unwilling to perform his side of 
the contract, in consideration for that party’s covenant to pay, usually 
upfront, a prescribed amount that is a fraction of the contract amount.   In 
other words, a contract is economically equivalent to an option if the 
contract, by its terms, caps one party’s liability for non-performance at an 
amount that is significantly less than the full contract amount.  In 
analyzing a particular contract, therefore, the relevant question is whether 
the contract enables the "purchaser" to withdraw from the agreement 
without incurring any additional liability at a fraction of the total contract 
price.
36 Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 TC 752 (1975) (Although terms such as 
"seller" and "purchaser" ordinarily are used only in bilateral sales instruments, an 
agreement nonetheless may constitute an option if its provisions enable the "purchaser" to 
withdraw from the agreement without incurring any additional liability.)
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It follows, then, that the presence of a liquidated damages 
provision in a bilateral contract can in some cases operate to convert what 
is formally a bilateral purchase and sale contract into an option.  However, 
in order to do so, and to vindicate the notion of free choice inherent in the 
notion of an option, it is essential that the non-refundable amount payable 
be only a small fraction of the total contract price.  Otherwise, the option 
holder will have too much “skin in the game” as to make exercise a 
foregone conclusion.37  In fact, one of the factors that courts have 
considered in assessing whether or not a contract is an option is the size of 
the non-refundable payment relative to the total contract price. 
In Lloyd Williams, Jr. v. Comm issioner,38 for example, the 
taxpayers signed agreements for the purchase of (to-be-constructed) 
condominiums in a transaction valued at $500,000, of which $60,000 was 
due on or shortly after the contract was signed.   In the event of default by 
the buyers, the sellers' exclusive remedy was to retain, as liquidated 
damages, the $60,000 down payment.  According to the court, the 
transaction was essentially equivalent to the sale of a call option on the 
property for $60,000, with the call exercisable in the following year. The 
cost of the purchase option amounted to 12% of the purchase price, which 
in the court’s view was not sufficient to convert the option into a sale at 
the time that the contract was signed. The court noted, however, that as the 
amount to be forfeited increases, a point is reached at which there will be a 
deemed sale.  By analogy, in the case of Baertschi v. Commissioner,39 the 
court found that the transaction resulted in a sale, rather than the grant of 
an option, when the buyer was required to make a 29% down payment that 
the seller could retain as its sole remedy.  Together, these cases show that 
when the down payment is substantial in size relative to the balance of the 
contract, a putative sales contract may be respected as one of purchase and 
sale, rather than as a true option contract.  
The same issue (excessively large down payment) arises in reverse 
when a contract that is styled as an option calls for an unusually large 
premium, and a correspondingly small amount payable on exercise.  The 
economic arrangement gives rise to the question of whether or not the 
putative option holder truly has free choice in whether or not to proceed
with the underlying transaction.  The issue, in other words, is whether or 
not there is an economic compulsion on the part of the option holder to 
exercise his purchase rights.40  For example, in Revenue Ruling 82-150,41
37
 Courts have held that the holder of an option must have a "truly alternative choice" to 
exercise the option or to allow it to lapse. Freight, 422 F2d at 895; Koch v. Comm’r, 67 
T.C. at 82.
38 1 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1993), affg TC Memo 1992-269 (1992),
39
 Baertschi v. Comm’r, CITE
40
 See Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363 (holding that a collateralized forward 
contract to sell stock is not a current sale if the shareholder is not economically
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 18
18
the Service treated the holder of an option to purchase stock as the current 
owner of the shares when the holder paid 70 percent of the stock's value 
for the option and the strike price of the option was 30 percent of the 
stock's value.   Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 85-87,42 a put option sold by 
the taxpayer was treated as a contract to acquire stock for purposes of the 
wash sale rules where there was “no substantial likelihood” that the holder 
would not exercise the option given the spread between the stock’s value 
and the option exercise price, the premium paid, the historic volatility of 
the stock, and other objective factors.   The term of art for options of this 
nature is “deep-in-the-money,” referring to options which have a nominal 
exercise price or that are otherwise substantially certain to be exercised.  
The holder of a deep-in-the-money option may be treated for tax purposes 
as directly owning the underlying property, and accordingly be taxed as if 
he were the direct owner of the property, rather than as the holder of an 
option.43
The Fourth Circuit in Halle v. Commissioner,44 applied the proper 
analysis for distinguishing between a stock purchase agreement 
(indebtedness) and an option, describing the following four factors as 
relevant to its analysis: 
(1) the amount of the contractually specified liquidated damages, 
(2) the extent to which [the purchaser] assumed real economic 
burdens of ownership before settlement, (3) [the buyer's] 
peripheral activities before settlement, and (4) the absence of 
apparent motives for creating an option contract.
The court viewed the amount of specified liquidated damages (the first 
listed factor) as critical to its treatment of the contract as one of sale and 
not an option contract because "the greater the sanction for failing to 
compelled to deliver the pledged shares); See also American Realty Trust v. United 
States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1199 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding a verdict that a transaction was a 
good-faith sale and lease-back with a repurchase option, in part because the seller was not 
under “economic compulsion” to exercise the option); see also Comtel Corp. v. Comm’r, 
45 T.C. 294, 307 (1965) (arrangement for stock purchase and subsequent sale of stock 
pursuant to an “option” was characterized as in substance a financing arrangement, in 
part because the Court concluded, after evaluation of the economic terms of the 
transaction, that taxpayer was “practically compelled” to exercise the option), aff'd, 376 
F.2d 791, 796 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967).
41
 1982-2 C.B. 110.
42
 1985-1 C.B. 268
43
 When both sides are economically compelled to follow through on the underlying 
transaction, in the sense that non-performance subjects the party to damages that are more 
than nominal, the contract is more properly regarded as a current sale, at least in 
situations where the option is exercisable at any time, or at least a conventional forward 
contract, in situations where the option has a fixed exercise date.  In either event, the 
contract does not get option treatment for tax purposes.  
44
 83 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1996).
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discharge a contractual obligation, the less free the obligor is to walk away 
from the deal."  Under the second factor cited by the court, the extent to 
which economic burdens are assumed prior to ownership, the court said, 
"Because the holder of an option retains the right not to purchase the 
subject property, he is unlikely to undertake significant obligations 
associated with ownership of that property."45 Since the buyer in Halle
had already incurred almost $4 million in costs, which were non-
recoverable, the court concluded that the buyer was too vested in the 
property not to proceed with the purchase. 
C. Contemporaneous Conveyance of Underlying Property
Implicit in the Halle court’s analysis is the notion that a bona fide 
option is predicated on a delayed transfer of either possession or the 
benefits and burdens of ownership of the underlying property from the 
inception of the relevant contract.  If there should be a current transfer of 
possession in conjunction with the granting of an option, the transaction is 
more properly viewed as a current disposition of the underlying property 
made on an installment sale basis.
In Commissioner v. Paulson,46 the taxpayer contracted in 1923 to 
purchase a building for $78,000, with the contract calling for an $8,000 
down payment, another $20,000 payable later in 1923, and $50,000 
payable in March 1934.  Upon execution of the contract, the taxpayer took 
possession, while undertaking obligations to keep the building in repair, 
keep it insured, and pay taxes.  While in possession of the building the 
taxpayer rented it for profit and made valuable improvements. Pursuant to 
the terms of the contract, upon the taxpayer's failure to make the final 
payment in 1934, the property reverted back to the seller, who was also 
entitled to retain prior payments, and that is what in fact happened. The 
court concluded that the reacquisition of the building by the seller in 
satisfaction of the purchase-money indebtedness constituted a sale or 
exchange and, therefore, the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct the prior 
payments as an ordinary loss. Similarly, in Alvin B. Lowe v. 
Commissioner,47 when the buyer made a down payment, gave a note for 
the balance of the price, took possession and began operation of a hotel in 
1955, the court held that there was a completed sale in that year, 
notwithstanding the later default by the buyer that resulted in a 
reconveyance of the property back to the original owner.
Finally, the contract at issue in Revenue Ruling 75-56348 was 
described as an irrevocable written option for the purchase of land under 
45
 Id. at 657.
46
 123 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1941).
47
 44 T.C. 363 (1965).
48
 1975-2 CB 199.
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which payments were to be made in ten equal annual installments, title to 
a portion of the tracts to pass with each installment paid. In some respects, 
the contract resembled a bona fide option.  For example, the purchaser 
could terminate the contract by not tendering an installment when due, in 
which case he would only be required to surrender possession of the 
portion of the tract to which title had not passed.  However, the purchaser 
had the right to immediate possession of the entire tract of land, had 
unrestricted use of the property, and was obligated to pay all real estate 
taxes and special amounts levied against the entire tract.  Under the 
circumstances, the transaction was treated as a sale from the outset.
D. Options in Disguise: Earnest Money Deposits, Loan 
Commitments, and Wal-Mart’s Layaway Plan
Based on the foregoing analysis, the defining characteristic of an 
option is the undertaking by one party at the inception of the contract to 
make a guaranteed non-refundable payment to the other --ordinarily paid 
upfront -- that is a fraction of the contract price, and whose payment 
relieves the payor of any further liability if it should be unable or 
unwilling to perform its end of the contract on or before the proscribed
closing or exercise date.  This definition is well-grounded in such case law 
precedents as Lawler, Estate of Franklin, U.S. Freight Co., and Halle.  
However, many recent cases concerning options have overlooked these 
authorities and focused more on language from recent cases such as Old 
Colony which are not really very illuminating in differentiating between 
options and other ordinary bilateral contracts.  
In reviewing some of the earliest cases, it is apparent that taxpayers 
have at times entered into options without quite realizing it, since the 
contracts call for non-refundable upfront payments but are not labeled as 
options.  The question that inevitably arose in these cases was how to 
account for the upfront payments that the property sellers received at the 
inception of their respective contracts.49 Given the dearth of any real 
49 For example, in Bourne v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 648, 649 (4th Cir. 1933), affg. 23 
B.T.A. 1287 (1931), the taxpayer entered into a contract to sell property the following 
year, with payment of $5,000 due on signing, and the remaining $20,000 due at closing.  
The court held that the $5000 deposit was not income until the property sale closed or 
failed to close, which is consistent with the rule for options.  
Similarly, in Baird v. United States, 65 F.2d 911, 912  (5th Cir. 1933), a partnership 
entered into a contract to sell an oil and gas lease for $2,500,000, with $500,000 payable 
upon signing, and another $300,000 due at closing along with a promissory note for the 
balance. The agreement further provided that upon the failure of the buyer to make the 
payment of $300,000 on or before February 8, 1920, the seller would have the right and 
option to declare the contract forfeited and to retain the sums already paid in full 
liquidation and settlement for damages, in lieu of any other or further damages whatever, 
and to discharge the buyer from any and all liability incurred by virtue of the agreement. 
The buyer defaulted on the payment of the $300,000.  Cast in the terminology of modern 
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analysis of the defining features of an option, along with the apparent 
unawareness on the part of the various parties that the contract may 
constitute an option contract, it is hardly surprising that the courts and the 
IRS have struggled to reach consistent results in all of the cases that have 
come their way.  
The best evidence of this confusion can be found in the fact that 
certain common transaction patterns featuring options have given rise to 
their own proprietary lexicons to describe the premium payments.  For 
example, the real estate sector uses the term “earnest money deposit” to 
refer to forfeitable down payments, while the term of art in the banking 
sector is “commitment fee.”  Even retail consumers who are not quite sure 
that they really need that new camera have for many years had the 
opportunity to enter into options to purchase the merchandise, at least
when shopping at such discount retailers as Wal-Mart and Target.  In the 
retail sector, the preferred terminology is “layaway.”
Earnest Money Deposits.  It is common in real estate transactions 
for prospective buyers to make an earnest money deposit at the inception 
of the contract.  If the buyer changes his mind and decides not to buy the 
property that is the subject of the agreement, the seller typically is allowed 
to retain the deposit, and the buyer is relieved of any further liability to the 
seller.  Interestingly, the cases which have addressed the tax treatment of 
earnest money deposits have essentially given them option treatment.  
That is, the recipient was not required to include the deposit in income 
until the buyer defaulted.50 However, the courts in these cases generally 
reached this result without ever appearing to recognize that the underlying 
contract was essentially an option contract. 51
Loan Commitments. When lenders issue a loan commitment to a 
potential borrower, they typically charge a commitment or loan origination 
fee, usually a percentage of the proposed loan, in return for the lender's 
agreement to make a future loan at a specified rate of interest.  In essence, 
they are fees for having money made available on a when-needed basis. 
Likewise, much bank lending is in the form of lines of credit which give 
the borrower the right to borrow money as the need arises, even if their 
creditworthiness declines. This right clearly has value, because in practice, 
borrowers tend to draw down unutilized credit lines as they deteriorate 
day options, the buyer simply failed to exercise.  The court ruled that the premium was 
not income in the year of receipt, in reliance on North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet 
and an open transaction analysis.
50 Bourne v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 648, 649 (4th Cir. 1933), affg. 23 B.T.A. 1287 
(1931). Kang v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-601; Kellstedt v. Commissioner, T.C. 
Memo. 1986-435. Baird v. United States, 65 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1933). 
51 Cf. Elrod v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1046, 1068-1069 (1986) (Because earnest money 
is in the nature of a payment for an option, it is included in the seller's ordinary income 
when forfeited to him.).
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towards default.  The credit agreement specifies the terms of the proposed 
loan and generally requires the borrower to pay a nonrefundable 
commitment fee. The right to increase their borrowing is analogous to the 
kind of protection sought by holders of options on property against
adverse price fluctuations.52
Substantively and economically, loan commitments are clearly 
options to borrow money.  However, the IRS has ruled that commitment 
fees are includible in the income of lending institutions in the taxable year 
in which it is due or actually received, if earlier.53 This ruling is directly 
contrary to the tax treatment of option premiums, which are held in a 
suspense account until the expiration date.  Interestingly, the revenue 
ruling did not explicitly reject option treatment for commitment fees; it 
simply never addressed it.54  The oversight presumably has its roots in the 
dearth of clear guidelines as to the true essence of an option.  
Another possible source of confusion is that the term “commitment 
fee” is often used in different settings with different meanings, so it is 
important to give proper consideration to the factual setting in order to 
avoid confusion. For example, when the Tax Court in Chesapeake Fin. 
Corp.,55 held that commitment fees which compensate a lender for the
performance of services are includible in income upon receipt, it was not 
necessarily affirming the revenue ruling. The fees in that case were 
received as a payment for specific services rendered to the borrower in 
arranging for a favorable loan package for the borrower with an 
52 When real estate investors need to lock in financing for projects under construction or 
undergoing rehabilitation, they sometimes take advantage of rate-locked forward 
commitment programs.  The lender agrees to grant a borrower a loan that takes effect at 
some future date, possibly one to two years.   The loan is signed at the current interest 
rate and that rate is held or locked in until the loan begins.  Thus, if the current rate is 4% 
and interest rates rise to 7% in two years, an investor who gets a two-year forward 
commitment would pay the 4% rate plus a slight premium, rather than 7% when the loan 
begins in two years. The fee is typically 2 or 3% and is non-refundable.
53
 Rev. Rul. 70-540, 1970-2 C.B. 101 (concerning the treatment of points, commitment 
fees, and service fees by the lender) The ruling was rendered obsolete in part by Rev. 
Proc. 94-29, 1994-1 CB 616 – but only with respect to the treatment of points by the 
lender—the portion of the ruling pertaining to commitment fees is still valid.  
54
 By comparison, the Tax Court held that nonrefundable “commitment fees” that loan 
originators paid to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac) should be 
recognized as premiums for put options, and therefore were not taxable income to 
Freddie Mac vs. Comm’r, 125 T.C. No. 12 (2005). Despite the favorable holding, the 
court took pains to note, in dicta, that the commitment fees in that case were 
distinguishable from the commitment fees received by lenders for an option to borrow 
money, which is the situation that was addressed by the revenue ruling.  The court noted 
that Freddie Mac did not make loans to originators; instead, Freddie Mac agreed to 
purchase mortgages from them.  On that basis, the court reasoned, the commitment fees 
in Freddie Mac did not pertain to an option to enter into a lending transaction, but rather 
an option to purchase mortgages from mortgage originators.  As argued in the text above, 
the distinction is ill-founded.
55
 Chesapeake Fin. Corp. v. Comm’r 78 T.C. 869 (1982).  
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institutional investor.56 The Court explained that the commitment fees 
compensated the taxpayer for "evaluating the economic potential of the 
proposed project, finding a willing investor to provide financing and then 
negotiating two separate commitments, one from the institutional investor 
and one that it issues to the borrower."57 On that basis, the Court held that 
the commitment fees were taxable in the year of receipt. However, 
Chesapeake Fin. Corp. does not address fees of the kind discussed above, 
namely those that compensate the lender for undertaking a commitment to 
fund a loan at specified terms if and when the borrower should request the 
funds.58
There is in fact no principled distinction between loan commitment 
options and other types of options.  The lender is paid a non-refundable 
fee upfront in exchange for obligating itself to lend money on pre-
arranged terms, even if circumstances should change.  The borrower, for 
its part, has the right to borrow the money, or not to borrow, as it sees fit.   
If the borrower decides not to borrow, the lender keeps the upfront fee, but 
the borrower otherwise has no further obligation to the lender.  
On the borrower’s side, borrowers have attempted to deduct these 
commitment fees as interest, but the IRS and the courts have rejected that 
characterization.59  Instead, the IRS has held that a commitment fee must 
be capitalized and amortized over the term of the loan.60  This happens to 
56 Id. at 878.
57 Id.
58 In fact, in Chesapeake Fin. Corp., the Court did not even address whether or not the 
fees might constitute option premiums. Instead, the taxpayer in Chesapeake Fin. Corp. 
argued that the "all events" test was satisfied when the loans were actually funded, not 
when it received the fees.
59
 According to the IRS, commitment fees, i.e., fees charged by a lender to make funds 
available to a potential borrower on a standby basis are not interest because they are not 
payments for the use of funds. Rev Rul 81-160 , 1981-1 CB 312 revoking Rev Rul 56-
136 , 1956-1 CB 92.  See also, Metropolitan Mortgage Fund Inc, v. Comm’r, 62 TC 110 
(1974) (If the fee is paid out of the potential borrower's separate funds, is not refundable 
in any event and will not be applied in reduction of any other charge (e.g., points, stated 
interest, or other fees), the fee is not interest.); Rev. Rul. 70-540, 1970-2 C.B. 101 (Under 
the above circumstances, the commitment fee is a charge for agreeing to make funds 
available to B rather than for the use or forbearance of money and, therefore, is not 
interest.).
60 Rev. Rul. 81-161, 1981-1 CB 313;   Rev. Rul. 81-160, 1981-1 C.B. 312.  Current law 
requires that such fees must be deducted ratably over the term of the loan to which they 
relate, and should not be added directly to the basis of the property that is acquired with 
the loan proceeds.  Loan fees are viewed as part of the cost of acquiring a loan as an asset 
(see Rev. Ruls. 86-67; 81-161). Generally, the Service does not “look through” the loan 
to consider the ultimate purpose for which it was secured. Rev. Rul. 81-160, 1981-1 CB 
312.  Herbert Enoch, v. Comm’r,  57 T.C. 781, 795 (1972) (loan and escrow fees are 
amortizable over the life of the loan. Square D v. Comm’r.,.  121 T.C. 168 
(2003)(amortization allowed for a nonrefundable loan commitment fee equal to 0.3 
percent per annum on $1 billion, payable monthly in advance until the bridge loan was 
disbursed)  See also Anover Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 671 (1960) (loan 
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 24
24
be consistent with characterization of the arrangement as an option.  
Ironically, the IRS itself has drawn an analogy to options in justifying the 
need for the borrower to capitalize these fees.
A loan commitment fee in the nature of a standby charge is an 
expenditure that results in the acquisition of a property right, that 
is, the right to the use of money. Such a loan commitment fee is 
similar to the cost of an option, which becomes part of the cost of 
the property acquired upon exercise of the option. Therefore, if the 
right is exercised, the commitment fee becomes a cost of acquiring 
the loan and is to be deducted ratably over the term of the loan.  If 
the right is not exercised, the taxpayer may be entitled to a loss 
deduction under section 165 of the Code when the right expires. 
(citations omitted).
Layaway. Options at the retail level, known more formally as 
layaway programs, are available at popular discount retailers such as Wal-
Mart Stores, K-Mart, Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, and TJ Maxx.  
Instead of buying an item on credit and taking it home, the customer pays 
a minimum deposit (10% at Wal-Mart) towards a fixed price, and the 
retailer physically sets the item aside.  The customer, who has 60 days to 
pay the rest before the purchases can be taken home, makes regular 
payments until the items are paid in full, and then retrieves it from the 
retailer. There are no interest charges.  
If the customer fails to make his payments, then after 60 days, the 
down payment is forfeited.  In some cases, if the customer changes his 
mind and cancels a layaway purchase, many stores will simply subtract a 
service fee, typically a $5 restocking fee, while refunding the balance of 
the layaway deposit.  Although there is no published guidance on how 
retailers should account for the layaway premiums, the arrangement is
essentially an option contract, because there is no current transfer of 
possession of the merchandise, and the customer potentially forfeits a 
portion of the purchase price of the item and is released from any further 
obligation to the retailer.  
III. NON-PROPERTY-BASED OPTIONS
A. Cash-Settled Options
acquisition costs amortized over the life of a loan, regardless of the loan's purpose or use 
of funds);  In Anover, the Tax Court held that loan -related expenses had to be amortized 
over the life of the underlying loan on the theory that such expenses are incurred in order 
to secure the use of money, throughout the loan period, as a basis for deriving income. 
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Historically, the term “option” has been largely synonymous with 
property-based options.  In fact, the usual and customary textbook 
definition of an option generally envisions a contract that ultimately 
culminates in the purchase and sale of property.   In exchange for a non-
refundable sum of money (the option premium), generally payable at the 
inception of the contract, the writer (seller) of the option contract grants its 
counterparty (the option holder) the right, without any obligation on the 
holder’s part, to buy or sell an underlying property interest at a specified 
price (the exercise price) on some future date (the exercise date).   
Notwithstanding this traditional definition, options to purchase
property frequently do not necessarily result in an actual conveyance of 
property, as many property-based options tend to be cash-settled.  A cash 
settlement option is an option which, on exercise, settles in cash or 
property other than the property that underlies the option.  For example, if 
an option holder has the right to call a share of Google stock for $ 100, the 
option would settle for an amount of cash equal to the excess, if any, of 
the trading price of a share of Google stock on the settlement date over $ 
100.  Cash- settlement options are clearly recognized as bona fide options 
for tax purposes.  The Tax Code specifically provides that a cash 
settlement option shall be treated as an option to buy or sell property for 
purposes of the statutory option character rules.61  According to a 
published revenue ruling, such options are considered options for purpose 
of other Code provisions as well.62
It is not difficult to see why cash-settled options are recognized as 
bona fide options for tax purposes.  Even if an option contract literally 
contemplates only the actual conveyance of the property, in practice, these 
instruments are frequently cash-settled by the mutual consent of the 
parties.  Accordingly, if the parties to an option contract include a 
provision expressly allowing cash settlement in lieu of conveyance of the 
property, the option should not be regarded as any less of an option.  Cash-
settled options function in much the same way as any other options.  Like 
any other option, they will either expire worthless, or else finish in-the-
money, resulting in either a physical conveyance or cash payout. 
61 Section 1234(c)(2)(A).
62 In Rev. Rul. 88-31, 1988-1 C.B. 302, analyzes, in a variety of different factual 
circumstances, the tax consequences of payments to a holder of a cash-settlement put 
option on publicly traded stock of a corporate issuer.  The corporation had issued 
investment units, consisting of one publicly traded common share and a separately 
tradeable contingent payment right, the value of which varied inversely with the market 
value of the underlying common stock. The contingent payment was scheduled to be 
made to the holder two years after the date of issue of the right.  In concluding that the 
separate interests were subject to the straddle rules of section 1092, the Service 
characterized that right as a cash settlement put option under section 1234(c)(2) as well as 
an option for purposes of the stock straddle exception of section 1092(d)(3)(B)(1).  
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It must be acknowledged, however, that once an option has been 
untethered from the need to convey physical property, it has been 
effectively transformed into a bet or wager on the underlying price index.  
Referring back to the example of a cash-settled option on Google stock, if 
the parties do not contemplate an actual conveyance of shares when they 
enter into the option, they are simply making opposite bets on the 
direction of the stock price of Google shares.  If option traders can make 
bets on a price index, it is not too difficult to construct option-type bets on 
other types of indicies as well.  
As noted earlier, there is in fact a whole new generation of option 
products, including weather derivatives, catastrophe options, and 
economic derivatives, in which the contingency is determined with 
reference to objective financial or meterological information, rather than 
with respect to an underlying property.  In the case of economic 
derivatives, for example, which allow investors to buy and sell options on 
a wide variety of economic data releases, there is seemingly no limit to the 
type of data index that can be used as the predicate for an option, 
including inflation statistics, initial jobless claims, auctions on nonfarm 
payrolls, U.S. GDP, international trade balances, U.S. initial jobless 
claims, and retail sales less autos.  
These cash-settled, non-property based products collectively raise 
the question as to whether or not they truly constitute options for tax 
purposes, notwithstanding that they are cast in the form of options.  Given 
their similarity in all other respects to conventional options, except for the 
absence of an underlying property, the operative question is whether the 
existence of some underlying property is a sine qua non for the existence 
of an option.
B. Lease Options, Service Options, and Swaptions
In truth, although commentators commonly refer to options as if 
they invariably relate to the purchase and sale of property, options are 
regularly, although less commonly, granted in other settings.  Options to 
lease property, for example, are common in the marketplace.  Clearly, 
these do not implicate the purchase or sale of property.  Suppose for 
example, that a law firm with a growing practice and currently leasing 5 
floors of an office building enters into an option to lease another 3 floors 
in order to accommodate future growth and pays a non-refundable 
premium in exchange for the privilege.  Should that contract not qualify as 
an option?  Presumably it should, and the lessor should not be required to 
take the option premium into income in the year in which it enters into the 
lease option.
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An option can just as easily relate to future services as it can to an 
underlying property.  Contractors and employees often enter into option 
contracts with respect to the future performance of services.  Options 
contracts are prevalent in the professional sports sector, as teams that enter 
into multi-year employment contracts with their players are often granted 
a team option to secure a player’s services for an additional year at a 
specified level of compensation.  To cite just one example, when the New 
York Yankees signed pitcher Mike Mussina to a 6-year $88.5 million 
contract in 2001, the player granted the Yankees an option, in exchange 
for a $1.5 million premium, for a 7th year at his 2006 salary of $17 million, 
which is exercisable in the 6th year of his employment.63 What part of that 
contract fails to qualify as an option?
Alternatively, sometimes an option can pertain to the right to enter 
into another contract, such as a financial contract, rather than the right to 
purchase property or services.  Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner64
involved an insurance policy that had a one-year term, but which 
permitted the taxpayer to renew the policy indefinitely at the same 
premium. According to the court, the premiums paid in early years 
effectively created a reserve, and a large portion of that amount
represented the option to renew indefinitely. The court was clearly willing 
to recognize that an option to renew an insurance policy could qualify as a 
bona fide option for tax purposes.65
In the financial products area, swaptions, which are option 
contracts granting the holder the option, but not the obligation, to enter 
into a financial swap contract with the writer at prescribed terms at some 
future designated date, have no underlying property as such. The delivery 
obligations of the swaption writer upon exercise of the swaption consist of 
an undertaking to enter into a new bilateral contract for a period of years.  
Nonetheless, since the primary features of an option on a swap remain 
economically similar to those of any other option, the notional principal 
contract regulations provide that swaptions should be taxed as options.66
63
 See http://www.mlb4u.com/nyy.html, the unofficial Yankees website.  The option 
premiums on player contracts are often paid on the exercise date, rather than at the time 
of grant, and are often labeled a buyout fee.  The website includes descriptions of similar 
contracts for other players, including Tino Martinez and Bernie Williams, both of whose 
options were declined by the team.
64
 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996)
65
 The taxpayer in Black Hills was not allowed to take a deduction for the option 
premium because he could not demonstrate the portion of each annual premium payment 
that was attributable to the option to renew.  However, there is no reason why future 
taxpayers could not learn from this case and arrange for a separately negotiated option 
agreement with separately stated option premiums. 
66
 Reg. Sec. 1.446-3(g)(3). Upon exercise of a swaption, the amount of the option 
premium would be taken into account like any other upfront premium paid on a notional 
principal contract.  If the swaption instead lapses unexercised, the writer would treat the 
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Swaptions in fact resemble options in every material respect. In a 
swaption, one party (the "purchaser") pays an initial "premium" payment 
in exchange for the right, without any corresponding obligation, to cause 
the other party (the "writer") to enter into a specified swap position, either 
on a particular "exercise" date, or like an "American Style" option, at any 
time during a particular period. If the purchaser exercises its option, the 
parties will enter into a swap on the terms specified in the option contract. 
If the purchaser fails to exercise its option prior to the stated expiration 
date, the parties will have no further contractual obligations.
Swaptions also provide the kind of downside price protection 
common to other types of option products. An interest rate swaption, for 
example, could provide protection to a prospective issuer of fixed-rate 
debt (or floating rate debt coupled with a swap into a fixed rate) concerned 
that prevailing interest rates may rise before the issue date.   The swaption 
would presumably be exercisable on the anticipated issue date for the 
taxpayer's debt, and permit the purchaser to swap a fixed rate that is 
determined by reference to rates prevailing at the time that the swaption is 
purchased, rather than the time when the underlying swap is entered into, 
and receive a floating rate that effectively decreases the interest payments 
on its debt obligations. 
C. New Products: The Wagering Conundrum
Since there are many examples of non-property-based options, 
what is the apparent basis for the assumed requirement of an underlying 
property for purposes of option classification?  In all probability, the 
standard definition may simply reflect the commercial norm that options 
have traditionally arisen most frequently in the context of conveyances of 
property.  Most of the case law on options involves options on real 
property, where physical settlement has long been the norm.  Another 
explanation may have its roots in the unspoken fear that, in the absence of 
an underlying property requirement, it may not be possible to differentiate 
between an option and a wager.  As one leading practitioner put it:
[C]an we comfortably say that any contract right involving a 
“premium” and a “strike price” and a payoff that depends on 
whether any objective information is above or below that strike 
price is an option?  That would, of course, lead racetracks to sell 
premium amount as income, and the purchaser would treat such amount as a loss, for the 
period that includes the option's expiration date. 
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race options based on whether Nicki’s Song wins the fifth race at 
Aqueduct. 67
The concern raised by this writer, if true, would be rather ominous, 
since wagering transactions are subject to highly punitive tax rules, 
including rules preventing gambling losses from offsetting other non-
gambling sources of income,68 as well as a restriction against carrying 
losses either forward or backwards.69
To be sure, options do bear an uncomfortably close resemblance to 
wagers.70 How is a cash-settled option different from a sports wager, 
economically- speaking?  Both entail risking money on the happening or 
not, of a contingent event.  To the extent that cash-settled options are 
virtually the same as wagers, how do we differentiate between options and 
wagering or gambling transactions?  The stakes are immeasurable, as 
noted, in light of the significant tax penalties associated with transactions 
that bear the wagering label.  
Fortunately, the term wagering as used in the Tax Code has not 
been broadly applied to all manner of bets; rather, it traditionally applies 
only to bets that are properly characterized as gambling.71  The common 
law definition of gambling for tax purposes is the same as the definition of 
gambling for state law purposes, which essentially entails a product that 
has the elements of prize, chance and consideration.72  While this  
definition could be interpreted broadly to cover a wide array of financial 
products, as a practical matter, true gambling has generally been limited to 
the world of sports, contests and other activities that may properly be 
described as consisting of fun and games, including card games like 
67
 Humphreys, note 2, at 19. Without engaging in any further analysis other than 
highlighting the apparent absurdity of the example, the author goes on to assert “Thus, we 
can safely conclude that the tax law does not extend option treatment to all contracts 
based on a contingency that can by styled an option.”
68
 Sec. 165(d) provides that “losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to 
the extent of the gains from such transactions.” The term “wagering” is undefined for this 
purpose.
69
 Section 172(c) defines a net operating loss as the excess of deductions allowed over 
gross income.  Under Section 165(d), gambling losses in excess of gross income are non-
deductible.
70
 On the surface, options may seem distinguishable from gambling-style wagers 
because most wagers have fixed odds and therefore have binary payouts.  However, 
binary options exist as well in the financial sector including cash-or-nothing calls, which 
pay off nothing if the asset price ends up below the strike price at time T and pays a fixed 
amount if it ends up above the strike price, or an asset-or-nothing call, which pays off 
nothing if the underlying asset price ends up below the strike price and pays an amount 
equal to the asset price if it ends up above the strike price.
71
 See, e.g., PLR 200532025 (a wagering pool is an arrangement to pool bets into a 
common fund, which are wagered on a sports event or contest, with the successful bettor 
(or bettors) receiving the pool proceeds...”)
72 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-556, 1970-2 CB 326.
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blackjack and baccarat or table games such as craps and roulette.73  The 
distinction, in other words, between cash-settled options and conventional 
wagers depends not on whether payoffs are triggered by the happening or 
not of contingent events, since that is true of all kinds of bets, but rather, 
on whether a particular bet in question arises in the context of sports, 
contests and activities that may properly be described as consisting of fun 
and games.  Only those types of bets are properly regarded as gambling 
both for state law and federal tax purposes.  In short, financial bets may be 
(and in fact, almost surely are) wagers, but they are not gambling-type 
wagers of the type subject to sanctions under the tax law.74
For that reason, speculation about, or incidental to, market- based 
risks is not gambling.  The underlying risks in this setting pertain to real 
business risks rather than contests, sporting events or other activities 
centered around leisure activities.  Weather derivative products, for 
example, may be used to hedge a business’s exposure to weather-related 
risks, allowing companies like power producers and insurance companies 
to hedge weather uncertainties just as they do commodity prices, 
currencies and interest rates.  Wind options, which are designed to pay out 
when the wind drops below a preset level, may seem frivolous in the 
abstract, but for wind farms, whose key risk is calm days, with too little 
wind to drive the turbines and generate electricity, they serve an important 
business need.  
Economic derivatives are used by hedge funds and large banks as a 
means of hedging portfolio risk on macro-economic statistics, since the 
investments they hold can quickly gain or lose value based on the latest 
releases. The index to which the gas storage options relate is one of the 
leading indicators for gas prices. Investors in this market include natural 
gas and oil companies and other companies seeking to manage their 
energy market risks as well as institutional investors and other risk 
intermediaries.  The market for mortgage prepayment derivatives draws 
heavily on investors in mortgage-backed securities, who face prepayment 
risk when mortgage prepayments are made faster than expected.   
73
 In fact, section 4421 defines “wager” for excise tax purposes as “(A) any wager with 
respect to a sports event or a context placed with a person engaged in the business of 
accepting such wagers, (B) any wager placed in a wagering pool with respect to a sports 
event or a contest, if such pool is conducted for profit, and any (C) wager placed in a 
lottery for profit.”  A contest includes any type of contest involving speed, skill, 
endurance, popularity, politics, strength, appearances, etc., such as a general or primary 
election, the outcome of a nominating convention, a dance marathon, a log-rolling, wood-
chopping, weight-lifting, corn-husking, beauty contest, etc.  Sec. 44.4421-1(c)(3),
74
 See Kevin Liss, Economic Derivatives and Other Speculative Bets: Reconsidering 
Traditional Notions of Gambling for the 21st Century (forthcoming article, a draft of 
which is on file with the author)
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What these disparate products share in common is the potential to 
allow traders to better manage specific categories of risks, while 
minimizing the basis risk associated with hedging using other types of 
financial instruments.  Under the circumstances, concerns about such 
business-related products crossing over into gambling terrain turn out to 
be misplaced, given the business justification for trading in these products.  
Accordingly, whatever passing resemblance these products may bear to 
gambling activity should not detract from their status as true options for 
tax purposes. 
III. CONTINGENT OPTIONS
A. Dubious Case Law Precedents
Does the fact that an option holder’s right of exercise is dependent 
upon the resolution of one or more contingencies prevent the instrument 
from qualifying as an option for tax purposes?  The question is highly 
relevant to credit default swaps, described earlier, which do not pay out 
unless there has been a credit event. Some of the cases on options have 
suggested just that, thereby casting doubt, in the view of some 
commentators, as to whether contingent options such as credit default 
swaps should be respected as options for tax purposes.75
The Tax Court in Saviano v. Commissioner, 76 for example, stated 
that an option whose exercise is subject to a contingency may fail to 
qualify as an option for federal income tax purposes.  In Old Colony v. 
Commissioner,77 the Tax Court was unwilling to ascribe option treatment 
to a contract in which the seller's rights to the underlying property had not 
yet been perfected, leading the court to describe the option as merely 
conditional.  Further support for this view can be found in Revenue Ruling
68-601,78 which addresses whether warrants and convertible debentures 
should be viewed as options for purposes of applying certain option 
attribution rules.  
However, careful examination of each of the relevant authorities 
shows that any implication in the reported decisions that the existence of 
contingencies is fatal to option classification is simply unwarranted, 
especially when the referenced opinion language is viewed within the 
proper context. Taking the last of these authorities first, Revenue Ruling
68-601 implies that in order for a right to be considered an option, there 
must be no conditions or contingencies attached to its election.  According 
to the ruling, 
75 See, e.g., Kayle, note 6.
76
 80 T.C. 955, 971 (1983), affd. 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985)
77 Old Harbor Native Corp. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 191, 201 (1995)
78
 1968-2 C.B. 124
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In order for a warrant to acquire stock to qualify as an option, the 
holder must have the right to obtain the stock at his election. When 
this right to acquire stock exists, warrants or convertible 
debentures are not realistically different from options as referred to 
in section 318(a)(4) of the Code. In each instance, stock may be 
acquired at the election of the shareholder and there exist no 
contingencies with respect to such election.  (emphasis added)
However, in a subsequent ruling, Rev. Rul. 89-64, the IRS noted that the 
phrase “at the election of the shareholder” was really just intended to 
distinguish options in which the right to exercise is subject to the control 
of the other party.  Obviously, if the right of exercise was contingent upon 
some element within the issuer’s control, that would undermine the 
option-like character of the instrument.  
The Tax Court decision in Old Colony (discussed at length later on 
in Part IV(E)(2)) rests on the proposition that an option contract must 
create an unconditional power of acceptance in the holder, if the holder 
chooses to exercise.  If the writer does not yet have ownership rights to the 
subject property, the existence of that contingency potentially undermines 
his fixed obligation to close at the election of the holder.  However, there 
is a difference between extraneous contingencies and conditions that are 
within the control of the option writer, a distinction that is glided over in 
these opinions.  For example, in the course of the Tax Court’s opinion in 
Saviano, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that his conditional 
option could be viewed as a bona fide option.  As the court explained, 
Petitioner describes his financing vehicle as a "conditional option" 
and refers to the "conditional nature of the option." We have found 
no case law, nor has he cited us to any, in support of his hypothesis 
that such an option qualifies for tax deferral. To the contrary, the 
courts have treated such an "option" as vague and unenforceable. 
See Saunders v. United States, supra; Booker v. Commissioner, 
supra. We conclude that the right to purchase extracted gold was 
not a binding, legal option.
The court in Saviano was clearly right to reject the taxpayer’s 
request for option treatment, but upon closer examination, the problem 
presented for option classification purposes was not the existence of a 
condition as such, as the court unfortunately implied in the preceding 
statement, but the fact that the condition was wholly within the control of 
the putative option writer.   The contract in issue, a purported option to 
buy all of the gold produced from a mine at a fixed price, by its terms did 
not require the option writer to mine any gold.  In concluding that the 
option to purchase the extracted gold was not a true option, the Tax Court 
noted that “If the optionee's power to accept is dependent upon some 
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further act of the offeror, then there is no unconditional option contract.”79
The court characterized the option as a preferential right of first refusal, 
noting that the “offeree's power of acceptance is severely limited by the 
condition that it is subject to the petitioner's decision to mine gold.”
Clearly, some contingencies are inconsistent with an option’s 
status as such. If the option writer has control over whether or not the 
contingent event happens, he may be tempted to exercise it, because the 
option writer in that event can retain the premium free and clear of any 
obligation to perform his side of the contract.  An option, after all, is 
supposed to be an asymmetrical contract.  The option holder has the clear 
right not to perform his leg of the contract, but the option writer has no 
such freedom.  Otherwise, the option is elective for both sides.  
For that reason, the case law holds that if the holder’s power to 
accept is dependent upon some further act of the offeror, then the holder 
has no true option.  For example, in private letter ruling 8936016, the IRS
ruled that holders of stock warrants are not deemed to own the underlying 
stock when the warrants may only be exercised if the corporation issues 
additional shares.  Clearly, the contingency was within the writer’s 
control.  Likewise, if a taxpayer has a right to buy all of the interests in a 
partnership within a fixed period of time following the partnership’s
receiving and accepting an offer from a third party to buy the partnership, 
it has a mere right of first refusal.80  Rights of refusal have traditionally 
not been viewed as option contracts. Rather, rights of refusal have 
generally been viewed as preemptive rights which are transformed into 
options to purchase only upon the holder's receiving notice from the 
grantor that the time period in which to refuse or accept should 
commence.81
In ruling that a right of first refusal is not a bona fide option, 
Saviano is therefore consistent with a long line of authorities that have
reached a similar conclusion.  Since the Tax Court in Saviano itself 
regarded the contract as one that implicated a mere right of first refusal, it 
would be a mistake to read the case more broadly as a rejection of 
contingent options generally, especially in situations where the underlying 
contingency is outside of the control of the option grantor.   
79 Id, at 970.  
80 Montelepre Systemed Inc,  61 TCM 1782 (1991), affd. 956 F2d 496 (5th Cir. 1992).  
81
 See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 468 F Supp 1085 ( D.C. MN 1979) (taxpayer’s 
right to purchase an additional Holiday Inn franchise in Rochester, Minnesota was 
contingent upon Holiday Inn initiated action with respect to additional franchises. As 
such it was a right of first refusal that never progressed to a point where it could be 
properly termed an option); City of Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska 1993) 
(agreement between two shareholders providing that if one party decides to sell or 
dispose of his stock in a bona fide transaction, the other may purchase the stock at the 
same price at which the proposed sale or disposition was to be made, isn't an option.
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B. Risk-Neutral Closing Conditions in Bilateral Executory 
Contracts
Should a contract that is subject to contingencies, even very 
substantial contingencies, be disqualified from option classification by 
virtue of those contingencies?  In order to properly address this question, it 
pays to first explore how an option that is subject to contingencies differs 
from an ordinary bilateral executory contract that is subject, as such 
contracts commonly are, to routine (or, in some cases, not so routine) 
closing conditions.  Does the presence of contingencies in that context 
detract in any way from the status of such contracts as legally binding 
bilateral contracts?  
Many ordinary bilateral contracts, in fact, contain a set of usual 
and customary closing conditions, such as the receipt of permits, 
regulatory approval, satisfactory construction or performance, or the 
availability of acceptable financing, which must be favorably resolved 
before the underlying transaction can proceed to closing.  These kinds of 
closing conditions are essentially exceptions to the obligation of the 
parties to perform their respective sides of the contract when they are 
unable or unwilling to close.  Ordinarily, the failure of a party to perform 
his side of a bilateral contract could expose that party to significant 
damages.  By contrast, if one or more closing conditions are not satisfied, 
then each party can walk away without being held in breach or required to 
pay damages to its counterpart.
Closing conditions, by their very nature, represent contingencies 
that must be favorably resolved in order for the underlying transaction to 
proceed to closing.  In practice, closing conditions often concern 
contingencies that the parties fully expect to be favorably resolved, but 
which are sufficiently important that at least one side or the other desires
certainty before proceeding with the transaction.  However, closing 
conditions can also address contingencies that are far from certain to be 
favorably resolved.  Regardless of how uncertain the underlying 
contingency may be, the common denominator is that the non-fulfillment 
of the condition allows the two sides to part ways without either one 
incurring any liability to the other for failure to perform.   
Regardless of whether the obligations of the respective parties to 
complete a transaction may be subject to reasonable closing conditions, 
such contracts are commonly regarded in the market place as enforceable
binding executory contracts.  The presence of contingencies does not 
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detract from the binding nature of these contracts as a matter of state law, 
at least as long as the condition is outside of the control of the two sides.82
Suppose, for example, that B agrees to buy S’s house on the 
condition that an expected job offer will come through for B.   If the 
condition is expressed as a closing condition, so that the sales contract is 
simply voided if the offer falls through, then B and S have a binding sales 
contract that is subject to a closing condition.  If the job offer does happen 
to fall through, B can decline to purchase the property without incurring 
any further liability. The ability to walk away from the contract scot-free 
is what renders the contract an ordinary bilateral sales contract that is 
subject to closing conditions.  The result is the same if B is required to 
make a down payment which is fully refundable upon failure to close.  
The contract remains a bilateral sales contract that is subject to closing 
conditions.  
Alternatively, suppose, as in the prior example, that B intends to 
purchase the house as long as an expected job offer comes through, but 
instead of entering into a contract with closing conditions, B is required to 
make a modest deposit that is non-refundable if B is unable or unwilling to
close on the purchase by a certain date, and that B is otherwise released 
from any further liability to S for failing to close.  Alternatively, suppose 
that B is required to pay the same amount as liquidated damages if it fails 
to close.  
As long as the amount payable is only a fraction of the contract 
price, such a contract would essentially be in the nature of an option.  
Comparing this example to the example in the preceding paragraph, it is 
evidently not the contingency alone that transforms a bilateral contract 
into an option, since most bilateral executory contracts have closing 
conditions that amount to contingencies.  Rather, it is only when the 
contingency is coupled with a forfeitable deposit that serves as liquidated 
damages in the event that the contingency is not favorably resolved, that 
the contract becomes economically equivalent to an option.83
The foregoing distinction between an option and an ordinary
bilateral contract with closing conditions, which focuses on whether one 
party is relieved from liability in exchange for an upfront payment, is 
consistent with the definition of an option which was developed earlier in 
Part I.  This benchmark furnishes an appropriate standard for assessing
82 On the other hand, if the stated condition happens to be within the control of the 
seller, the contract is more properly viewed as a conditional sales contract.
83
 In Insilco vs. United States, 53 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit declined to 
treat a bilateral contract subject to closing conditions as an option on the apparent 
premise that a bona fide option must be unconditional.  The case did not in fact involve 
contingent options; it involved a bilateral contract subject to closing conditions, which is 
in fact distinguishable from an option contract because of the ability of the parties to walk 
away from one another without penalty if the conditions go unfulfilled.
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whether an arrangement truly constitutes an option for tax purposes.  
Suppose, for example, that a putative buyer makes a deposit on a contract 
to purchase property that is subject to a structural inspection satisfactory to 
the purchaser or subject to regulatory approval.  Would such a contract be 
regarded as an option?  The real question is whether the contract enables 
the "purchaser" to withdraw from the agreement, for a modest fee, without 
incurring any additional liability.  If so, the contract is an option.  If there 
is no such fee or any other liability, the condition is a condition to closing, 
and the contract is an ordinary bilateral contract.
Based on the foregoing analysis, determining whether or not a 
contract should be treated as an option contract depends upon whether and 
under what circumstances any required deposit is refundable, and insofar 
as the deposit is non-refundable, proper classification depends on the size 
of the deposit relative to the contract price.  If the deposit is refundable, 
the contingency is merely a closing condition.84  If, however, the contract 
84 This rule does not necessarily apply with respect to put options.  A put option 
premium that is refundable upon purchase of the underlying property may be equivalent 
to a non-refundable premium and a reduced purchase price. For example, in Freddie 
Mac, a case involving putative put options permitting mortgage originators to sell 
mortgages to Freddie Mac, the upfront fees payable by originators consisted of a 0.5-
percent nonrefundable portion and a 1.5-percent refundable portion. If a mortgage was in 
fact sold, the refundable portion of the commitment fee was refunded to the seller, but the 
remaining 0.5% balance of the fee was not. If the originator failed to deliver a loan, 
Freddie Mac was allowed to retain the entire 2-percent commitment fee, which was 
deemed forfeited. The IRS objected to Freddie Mac’s failure to take into income the 0.5% 
portion of the fee that was non-refundable in all circumstances.  The Tax Court held that 
this portion of the fee should be treated as premium for put options, resulting in deferred 
income recognition.  
Interestingly, the opinion addressed only whether the nonrefundable portion of the 
commitment fees was deferrable as an option premium, the IRS conceding that the 
refundable portion of the upfront premium was properly excludable from income.  In a 
footnote, the court noted that the IRS was not challenging the taxpayer’s exclusion of the 
1.5-percent refundable portion of the commitment fee from income at the time of receipt.  
As the court explained, the taxpayer had set up a payable upon its receipt of refundable 
fees, and these amounts were only taken into income if the underlying mortgages were 
not delivered to petitioner. While the treatment of these fees seems appropriate for book 
purposes, the tax law does not allow taxable income to be excluded by the mechanism of 
setting up an offsetting payable.  If the refundable fee was properly excludable for tax 
purposes, there must be some other rationale justifying its exclusion.  What was the basis 
for excluding this portion of the fee?  The answer, oddly enough, is that this fee, too, 
constituted an option premium, even though it was nominally refundable. 
The critical fact is that even the nominally refundable 1.5% upfront payment was 
rendered non-refundable should the option holder decline to exercise the option.  In that 
respect, the payment perfectly resembled the economics of a typical option premium.  
The payment was “refundable” to the put option holder if the holder exercised the option, 
but since the option was a put option, the option writer was required in any event to make 
a payment to the purchaser at the time of exercise.  If the contract by its terms had simply 
provided for a reduced purchase price corresponding to the amount of the upfront fee, 
while providing no refund of the upfront payment, the transaction economics would have 
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calls for forfeiture of the deposit should the condition remain unfulfilled as 
of closing, the contract should be viewed as an option contract, at least as 
long as the deposit is only a small fraction of the contract price.  If the 
deposit is more than a modest amount, the putative option may be a deep-
in-the-money option, which would not be regarded as a bona fide option 
for tax purposes.  Regardless of the facts, the option definition developed 
thus far furnishes a suitable basis for ascertaining whether or not the 
arrangement truly amounts to an option for tax purposes.
C. (Buyer) Risk-Shifting in Option Contracts
In Halle, one of the options cases discussed earlier, the court took 
into account, in assessing whether the contract at issue was either a sales 
contract or an option, the absence of any motive to purchase an option.  
The court pointed out that option contracts by their very nature permit 
parties to shift the risks of contingencies. According to the court, "Where 
there are no significant risks to apportion, therefore, there is little reason 
for the parties to contract for an option."85
The court’s observation about risk-shifting reflects a critical insight 
into one of the fundamental purposes of an option.  An option premium in 
respect of a call option economically represents a payment for a shift in 
the risk of buyer-specific contingencies from the buyer to the seller 
compared to the risks normally undertaken in a bilateral executory 
contract.  The assumed risk entails buyer protection from a decline in the 
value of the property pending the closing or exercise date, which would 
been exactly the same.  The analogous situation in the case of a call option would be a 
contract that by turns provides for an upfront premium to be credited against the exercise 
price, or alternatively provides no such credit, but contains an exercise price that is 
reduced by a like amount.  The IRS has acknowledged the equivalence of these two cases 
in the call option context.   Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279    
Since the IRS in the Freddie Mac case was troubled by the taxpayer’s exclusion from 
income of only the 0.5% non-refundable portion of the upfront premium, the taxpayer 
could presumably have avoided the litigation by modifying its contracts so that the 
purchase price formula was automatically grossed up by the amount of the 0.5% fee, and 
then providing for a refund of the 0.5% fee upon closing a purchase of the mortgage.  If 
no mortgage was ultimately tendered, the refundable 0.5% fee would be still be 
forfeitable, just as the remaining 1.5% was.  But insofar as the fee was nominally 
refundable, the IRS apparently would not have objected if the taxpayer failed to include it 
in income.
85 Halle v. Comm’r, 83 F.3d at 657; Similarly, the Tax Court in Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) vs. Comm’r, examined why an originator would be 
willing to pay a nonrefundable commitment fee in return for retaining an option to deliver 
the mortgage. The court found that originators chose to pay the commitment fee to 
protect themselves from fluctuations in interest rates during the period when the option 
was open and the uncertainty associated with the possibility that the mortgages might not 
close within the delivery period.  125 T.C. No. 12 at  . 
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normally be for the buyer’s account if the buyer had entered into a 
bilateral contract.86
A comparison between options and bilateral executory contracts 
which contains conditions to closing is instructive to illustrate the risk 
shifting that is normally undertaken when parties enter into option 
contracts.  Bilateral contracts containing closing conditions generally do 
not shift the risk of a contingent event from the party that structurally 
bears it to a counterparty that is willing to assume it.  For that reason, 
money generally does not change hands when closing conditions go 
unfulfilled in a bilateral contract.  Closing conditions carry no financial
penalty because they tend to be inherent seller risks that that no buyer 
would be expected to assume, at least not as long as the buyer is 
contracting to pay the full, undiscounted value for the underlying item.  
Options, on the other hand, tend to allocate buyer-specific risks to the 
seller in exchange for a non-refundable premium.  For this reason, 
ordinary bilateral contracts subject to closing conditions tend generally to 
implicate seller-specific risks, such as title defects or problems relating to 
the condition of the specific property, whereas option contracts tend to 
implicate buyer-specific risks, including risks peculiar to the particular 
buyer or market-based risks.  
Options contracts provide prospective buyers a means of 
compensating property owners for laying off buyer-specific risks, and in 
return, the seller agrees to release the prospective buyer from his purchase 
obligations if the event happens or fails to happen, as the case may be, 
without any further obligation.87  For example, a property may be worth 
$155 to the prospective buyer if a job offer comes though, but not if it 
does not.  If the prospective buyer were to enter into a bilateral sales 
contract, and the job offer failed to materialize, he would be left holding a 
property that he no longer wants. He would be assuming liquidity risk, 
carrying costs for the unwanted property, the time and the expense of 
having to sell the property, and the prospect of a loss on the resale since 
the previous highest bidder – himself – is no longer in  the pool of potential 
buyers.  By entering into an option, the option holder, in exchange for a 
fixed fee, is shifting the burden of that particular contingency to the seller.  
Sometimes there may even be more than one contingency.  
In principle, it is possible, although less common, for buyer-
specific risks to be included as closing conditions.  The problem is that 
sellers are generally unwilling to take on these risks as mere closing 
86
 Put option premiums, by contrast, entail risk-shifting in the opposite direction, from 
the seller of the underlying property to the buyer.  A put option preserves for the seller 
the benefit from any upside movements in the value of the property pending the closing 
or exercise date.
87
 The roles of the parties is reversed in the case of a put option.
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conditions if they can sell the property to another buyer for the same price.  
If the sale falls through, the seller must bear the carrying costs of the 
property pending a resale to some other buyer.  A seller is liable to ask 
why he should bear the risk of the buyer’s uncertainty, unless he is being 
compensated to do so.  As long as the risks are peculiar to the particular 
buyer, the buyer will usually have to pay the seller an inducement fee in 
order to induce the seller to bear this buyer-specific risk, which could take 
the form of an option premium, or by charging an above-market price.
D. Closing Conditions in Option Contracts
The preceding section distinguishes option contracts from bilateral 
contracts which have closing conditions.  It is certainly possible, however, 
to have an option contract which also contains closing conditions.   In fact, 
there is no reason why the parties should not be able to agree that certain 
stated closing conditions must be fulfilled, or else the option holder will be 
refunded his premium.  Routine closing conditions amount to exceptions 
to the rule that an option premium is not refundable.  Accordingly, an 
option contract that has closing conditions would presumably require the 
option premium to be refunded upon the non-fulfillment of that condition.  
As long as there remain other circumstances beyond the control of either 
party under which the buyer’s deposit is non-refundable, the option should 
still be viewed as a bona fide option contract notwithstanding the presence 
of closing conditions.  
Closing conditions, as previously noted, tend to pertain to seller-
specific contingencies that would affect any buyer with whom the seller 
chooses to engage.  For example, the buyer may be relying on seller 
representations as to the condition of the subject property, which are 
assumed by the buyer to be true as he decides whether or not to exercise 
the option.  If the representations prove false, the buyer should be entitled 
to a refund of his premium, because his decision not to exercise was not 
based on an unfulfilled buyer-related contingency, but rather, due to the 
fault of the seller.  
Suppose for example that a seller who does not have clear title to 
the property writes an option to sell the property to a prospective 
purchaser who is awaiting a job offer, and receives in exchange an upfront 
premium.  In this situation, there are both buyer-specific risks and seller-
specific risks.  How might we reasonably expect the parties to allocate 
these risks?
Since no buyer would be expected to pay full value for the 
property unless he can acquire clear title, the contract may require the 
seller to clear up title as a condition to closing, failing which the buyer 
should be refunded its option premium.  On the other hand, as long as the 
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seller is able to convey clear title, meaning that the closing condition is 
fulfilled, the seller should ordinarily not be expected to bear the burden of 
the buyer’s job offer falling through unless the buyer compensates the 
seller to bear that risk.  Accordingly, one might reasonably expect that the 
contract would provide for the buyer to forfeit his premium if his job offer 
falls through, as is standard practice with respect to options.  In short, 
there is no fundamental problem with having an option contract that is also 
subject to specific closing conditions whose non-fulfillment would cause 
the option premium to be refunded, without detracting in any way from 
the status of the contract as an option contract.
The case of Ferydoun Ahadpour v. Commissioner,88 addressed a 
contract that was essentially an option, but one which also had significant 
closing conditions attached. The taxpayers in Ahadpour were paid an 
option premium, which was described as a non-refundable escrow 
payment, in connection with a contract to sell property. However, the 
contract also provided that if the transaction failed to close for any reason 
other than a buyer default, the deposit would be refunded to the buyer.  
The prospective sale was in fact called off after the State of 
California claimed a public trust easement on the property, making it 
impossible for the sellers to deliver clear title.  As a result, the sellers 
returned most of the escrow money under a release agreement. This is 
exactly what we would expect to happen when closing conditions go 
unfulfilled.  The fact that the upfront payment was refundable under these 
circumstances does not mean that the contract was not an option.  What it 
means is that the conditions to closing went unfulfilled. As with any 
option, had the sale failed to close because the buyer was unable or 
unwilling to do so, the buyer would have been required to forfeit his 
upfront payment.  
The court in Ahadpour managed to reach the right result, holding 
that the sellers did not have to include the deposit in income in the year of 
receipt, but managed to do so not by characterizing the contract as an 
option, which is what it truly was, but because it claimed that the sellers 
had only a conditional right to retain the deposits.  There was, after all, an 
existing and fixed obligation for petitioners to repay the deposits in the 
event that the sale did not close “for any other reason other than a default 
by Buyer.” The court’s “obligation to repay” analysis operated to remove 
the transaction from the scope of the “claim of right” doctrine, a common 
law tax rule which normally requires cash proceeds to be taken into 
income upon receipt.  In truth, there was no such fixed obligation to repay 
the deposit, as such, since the deposit was still forfeitable as long as the 
seller could cure his title problem.  The court was apparently confused by
the interaction between the option element and the contract’s conditions to 
88 T.C. Memo 1999-9 
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closing.  The better explanation for not applying the claim of right 
doctrine is that the contract was essentially an option contract. Even non-
refundable premiums are in fact refundable if the seller is unable or 
unwilling to convey the underlying property at the time of exercise. 
E. Seller-Based Risk-Shifting
1. Clouded Title and Next Wave Scenarios
As a further demonstration of how seller-based contingencies can 
coexist with a bona fide option, consider the situation that arose in 
connection with the disputed ownership rights in certain airwave licenses 
that the federal government attempted to sell at auction during the mid-
1990’s. A company called Next Wave Telecom Inc. (“Next Wave”) won 
an auction for airwave licenses in 1996 and made a down payment of 
$500,000 as the first installment on its obligation to pay approximately $5
billion over 10 years.  However, the company was unable to make its 
remaining payments, and wound up filing for bankruptcy protection.  The 
government responded by confiscating the licenses and reselling them in 
an auction for an even greater amount.  Next Wave litigated, on the 
grounds that federal bankruptcy law prohibited the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)  from taking back the licenses 
notwithstanding Next Wave’s default on its obligation to pay for them.
Whether or not Next Wave’s claim was meritorious, its property 
rights in the licenses were in doubt at that point, as the matter was before 
the courts.  Assume for purposes of this analysis, that the license had a 
value (after subtracting the balance due on the acquisition indebtedness) of 
$10 billion in the absence of any controversy over its ownership rights, 
and that Next Wave had a 50:50 chance of prevailing in the litigation.  In 
that event, Next Wave would have been in possession of contingent 
property rights worth $5 billion, an amount which is derived by 
calculating the expected value of a binary option that has even odds of 
either paying off $10 billion or expiring worthless.  If Next Wave had 
wanted to sell down its interest in these contingent property rights pending 
resolution of the litigation, it had several contractual alternatives, 
including a contract for sale at full value, subject to closing conditions
concerning successful pursuit of its claim; an outright sale of its 
contingent ownership rights, properly discounted for the uncertainty of the 
litigation; or the writing of an option. 
In the first instance, Next Wave could conceivably have agreed to 
sell its interest for $10 million, its full value, subject to a closing condition 
that Next Wave must prevail in vindicating its rights to the license against 
the federal government.  Failing that condition, the sale would be off, with 
neither party owing the other any damages.  This scenario would appear to 
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be commercially reasonable, since the underlying risk was a seller-based 
risk, and these kinds of risks are commonly covered by closing conditions.
In the alternative, since waiting for the litigation to be resolved 
could take many years, Next Wave might see fit to monetize its 
investment sooner rather than later.  If Next Wave chose to bail out of its 
investment without waiting for a resolution of the federal litigation, it 
could do so by selling its interest outright under the terms of a contract 
containing no closing conditions related to the outcome of the litigation.  
In these circumstances, however, the rights should sell for only $5 billion, 
which would be the value of the rights while under a cloud of litigation.
Finally, suppose instead that Next Wave wanted to maintain an 
interest in the litigation, but preferred to scale down its exposure from the 
all-or-nothing situation in which it found itself.  Instead of an outright sale 
of its rights for discounted value, or a sale for full value subject to closing 
conditions, as in the prior scenarios, it might choose to sell an option to 
buy the disputed license in exchange for a smaller, non-refundable option 
premium.  Under this scenario, it would be commercially reasonable for 
Next Wave to sell a $1 billion option to buy the license for $7 billion, 
exercisable at any time within a fixed period of time, which should be 
greater than the anticipated amount of time needed for the litigation to be 
resolved.  Realizing $1 billion in this fashion might very well be a more 
attractive proposition to Next Wave than taking a chance on receiving 
nothing should it lose the litigation, and it also provides a mechanism for 
monetizing a portion of its investment.   
If an option having these terms should pay off, the option holder 
would be able to resell the license for $10 million, yielding a $2 million 
gain.  If the option expired worthless, it would have a loss on the $1 
million premium payment.  Next Wave, for its part, would reduce its 
downside exposure and upside exposures overall from a possible loss of 
$500,000 and a gain of $10 million to a guaranteed net profit ranging in 
size from $500,000 to $7.5 million depending on the outcome of the 
litigation.
Does the fact that Next Wave’s property rights in the licenses 
under this scenario are wholly contingent defeat the existence of an 
option?  After all, Next Wave has no clear property rights to convey until 
the contingency is resolved, which means that the option holder does not 
have the right to acquire the property at any time by paying the exercise 
price.  On the other hand, the option holder would be risking $1 billion in 
the hopes of realizing a $2 billion profit, because if Next Wave lost the 
litigation, the holder would be out $1 billion, and if Next Wave prevailed, 
the option would pay out.  By comparison, if the option holder had 
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purchased the contingent rights outright, it would have been risking $5 
million, a much greater amount.  
It is not readily apparent how these economics are any different 
from those inherent in any other garden-variety option.  Consistent with 
the definition of an option developed earlier, the contract enables the 
"purchaser" to withdraw from the agreement, for a modest fee, without 
incurring any additional liability.  Under the circumstances, writing an 
option on contingent property rights appears to be no less tenable than 
writing an option on any other property rights.  
2. OLD COLONY CASE
The lessons derived from the Next Wave scenarios are useful for 
dissecting Old Harbor Native Corp. v. Commissioner,89 a rare case which 
implicates a seller-based contingency.  The taxpayer in Old Harbor 
granted an oil producer an option to lease subsurface rights to property 
that it did not currently own, in exchange for non-refundable upfront 
payments.  The taxpayer was in the process of acquiring the subject 
property from the federal government, and the acquisition was undertaken 
pending resolution of several contingencies that were outside the control 
of the parties, including, inter alia, Congressional approval.  Ultimately, 
the contingencies were never resolved, the taxpayer never acquired 
ownership of the subject property, and the lease rights were terminated.  
At issue was whether the taxpayer should have reported the upfront 
payments as income in the years of receipt as advance contractual 
payments, or whether the premiums should get the benefit of deferral 
treatment, under the rules applicable to option premiums.  As with the 
Next Wave situation described in the preceding section, the underlying 
property rights that were the subject of the putative option were contingent 
property rights, rather than property that the option grantor owned 
outright.  
The Tax Court in Old Harbor rejected the taxpayer’s 
characterization of the contract as an option, concluding that an option 
holder's right to lease subsurface rights that it did not currently own was 
“too vague and uncertain” to constitute an unconditional option to lease 
those rights.  The court was particularly troubled by the fact that the 
contract to acquire the property rights from the federal government was 
subject to various contingencies outside of the taxpayer’s control, and that 
two of those contingencies were never met. Under the circumstances, the 
putative lessee “possessed nothing more than a mere expectancy of 
receiving those rights.”
89
 104 T.C. 191 (1995).
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As the court correctly observed, the taxpayer's right to the mineral 
lease (and therefore its ability to deliver the mineral lease to the 
counterparty) was clearly subject to material contingencies not within its 
control (a change of law to allow drilling in the Alaskan wilderness and 
the execution of an agreement with the Department of Interior).  In that 
respect, however, the contract to acquire those rights was simply an 
ordinary bilateral contract subject to various closing conditions, no 
different from many other common commercial bilateral contracts.90
The lease option agreements, for their part, were asymmetrical in 
nature, like most garden-variety options.  The agreements called for the 
lessee to pay the taxpayer $5.3 million in premiums for an option on 
property that had a fair market value of $45 million.  The contracts 
provided that the lease would expire if the taxpayer was unable to close on 
its acquisition of the underlying property by certain prescribed dates, or 
earlier if it became known that the anticipated closing would not occur, 
with no apparent obligation on the part of the grantor to refund the option 
premium – again another sign of a bona fide option  The taxpayer grantor, 
for its part, could not unilaterally terminate the lease agreements, and thus 
could not have prevented the lessee from unilaterally accepting the 
taxpayer’s offer to lease that property.   In other words, one party had free 
choice as to whether to proceed to closing; the other did not, consistent 
with option treatment.  The amount of the option premium was a relatively 
small fraction of the total contract price.  All in all, there is nothing here 
that is fundamentally inconsistent with option treatment.
That said, the case does present an odd set of facts because options 
do not commonly arise in connection with seller-based contingencies, 
risks that, one would assume, should properly be for the seller’s account, 
rather than something that the buyer would willingly pay to undertake.  
Normally, a prospective purchaser in those circumstances might 
reasonably be expected to enter into a conventional bilateral contract for 
the full fair market value of the property, but subject to closing conditions 
related to the seller’s ability to acquire the relevant rights.  If the 
conditions were to remain unfulfilled, both parties would have a free 
“out.”  Under this scenario, there would be no need for either side to make 
an upfront premium payment to the other.  Alternatively, insofar as the 
90
 In particular, the contract consisted of an agreement with the DOI to exchange 
surface rights to certain Alaskan lands for Government-owned subsurface rights in oil 
and gas located in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge on the North Slope of Alaska 
(ANWR). The Proposed DOI Agreement was contingent upon the occurrence of the 
following three events: (1) Ratification of the Proposed DOI Agreement by petitioner's 
shareholders; (2) enactment by the Congress of legislation opening the ANWR to oil and 
gas development (Opening Legislation); and (3) enactment by the Congress of legislation 
approving the Proposed DOI Agreement (Exchange Legislation).  Two of these 
contingencies were never met.  
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 45
45
contract did require the lessee to make an upfront down payment, the 
contract would reasonably be expected to provide for that payment to be 
fully refundable should the option writer fail to acquire rights to the 
underlying property.   In Old Colony, however, the lease agreement 
purported to be for the full fair market value of the property rights, and 
provided for several conditions to closing, and yet, contrary to the usual 
failure of closing conditions, the lessee’s upfront payments were 
apparently non-refundable.  In short, the arrangement does not seem 
commercially reasonable, if the facts are what the taxpayer claimed them 
to be.   
Since the taxpayer’s rights to the property were under a legal 
cloud, it might have been commercially reasonable for the lessee to 
contract to acquire the contingent property rights outright, unconditionally, 
i.e., without any closing conditions, as long as the unconditional contract 
bore a discounted price, reflecting the value of the property properly 
discounted for the cloud on the taxpayer’s legal rights to that property.91
However, the contract in Old Colony did not meet this description of an 
outright purchase, because it was in fact conditional, and, if the transaction 
were to be consummated, the lessee was required to pay the full 
undiscounted value for its rights.  In short, the lease agreement did not 
implicate an outright unconditional acquisition of the lease rights.
It is also conceivable under these circumstances that a buyer would 
be willing to enter into a conventional option contract, paying an upfront 
premium in exchange for the chance to make a bargain purchase of the 
property, similar to the last Next Wave scenario described in the previous 
section.  In Old Colony, however, although the lease agreement required 
the lessee to make two non-refundable upfront payments, the contract 
would have required the lessee, upon exercise, to pay full value for the 
lease rights, assuming that the taxpayer was able to acquire them from the 
government.  It does not make sense economically for the lessee to risk a 
non-refundable payment on an acquisition of potentially worthless 
property unless there is some upside potential should the seller’s legal 
rights to the property be perfected.  In other words, a prospective buyer 
should not have to pay the seller money for the assumption of what are 
peculiarly seller-based risks, namely its ability to perfect its own legal title
to the property underlying the option.  Under the circumstances, it is not 
91
 Interestingly, an outright purchase of all of the seller’s interest in contingent property 
rights would under the circumstances give the purchaser all of the economics of an option 
– the prospect of making alternately either a worthless purchase, or a bargain purchase of 
valuable property.  However, a contract giving rise to these option-like economics could 
not properly be considered an option contract, since there is no mechanism for releasing 
the purchaser’s contractual obligations for a fraction of the contract price.  In short, the 
entire contract price would be due and payable unconditionally, contrary to the 
mechanics of an conventional option.  
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easy to reconcile the required payment of a non-refundable option 
premium in Old Colony with reasonably expected commercial norms.
If it was not commercially reasonable for the lessee to make an 
upfront payment on the lease agreement, it seems most likely that the 
counterparty was paying for something other than an option on the lease 
rights, as the Tax Court itself ultimately appears to have recognized.  As 
the court explained,
We also believe that the payments that Texaco made to petitioner 
for the Lease Agreements were not made in their entirety for the 
privilege of electing to lease the subsurface rights that petitioner 
might have received from the Government. Among other things, 
we find that petitioner received part of those payments in 
consideration of its agreeing to promote the Opening and 
Exchange Legislation. In addition, we find that Texaco executed 
the Lease Agreements, in part, to persuade petitioner to 
consummate the Proposed DOI Agreement.
In other words, it appears that Old Colony may have been correctly 
decided, after all, based on the facts presented, on the grounds that the 
upfront payments were not really intended as option premiums.   Under 
the circumstances, the court’s assertion that contingent options can not 
qualify as bona fide options was not only ill-considered, in light of the 
foregoing analysis, but really unnecessary to resolve the case before it.  In 
any event, Old Colony hardly furnishes a robust foundation upon which to 
hitch the notion that a contingent option is necessarily a defective option, 
as insinuated by some of the authorities that have followed that decision.  
The option at issue in Old Colony plainly satisfies the common law 
standard for an option, and since the court had separate grounds for 
requiring inclusion of the deposits in income in the year of receipt, the 
court’s comments about the fundamental nature of an option should not 
guide an analysis of other option-related cases.92
92 On the surface, Freddie Mac appears to be another contingent option case like Old 
Colony, because the mortgages underlying the options in that case were all yet-to-be-
issued mortgages.  Unlike Old Colony, the court did not address whether the contracts 
might have failed to constitute options on the grounds that they were merely contingent 
or conditional options, insofar as the underlying property was not yet owned by either 
party. However, the factual context differed from that in Old Colony.  The option at issue 
in Freddie Mac was a put option, which is fundamentally different from a call option 
because the roles of the parties are reversed.   With respect to a put option, the option 
writer is the putative purchaser of the property, and the option holder is the seller.  Since 
the option holder has the inherent right to choose not to proceed with the underlying 
transaction in any event, the fact that he does not yet have ownership of the property 
poses no issues for option classification.  In fact, it is common for investors to buy put 
options without holding the underlying property.  The options in Freddie Mac were 
treated as bona fide options.  
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F. Formulary Nature of Options
The question presented at the outset of this Part IV was whether an 
option can still qualify as an option if the ability to exercise the option is 
subject to one or more contingencies.  Stated differently, if there are 
restrictions on the right of a holder to exercise the option, or if the right of 
exercise is subject to contingencies which may never occur, can the 
instrument still qualify as an option?  The preceding analysis not only 
answers this question affirmatively, it also demonstrates that even ordinary 
bilateral contracts tend to be imbued with underlying contingencies.
The conventional portrayal of an option implies that the decision to 
exercise or not is a matter for the unfettered discretion of the option 
holder.  In short, the decision to exercise or not is entirely subjective.  
While true in a literal sense, since the holder clearly has the ultimate 
power to decide, the question of whether or not the holder will in fact 
exercise the option is more often than not highly determinable and thus 
does not depend upon the mood or whim of the holder.  Rather, it 
generally depends upon the resolution of one, or possibly even more than 
one, contingency.
A large category of options, for example, pertains to publicly 
traded property.  Suppose for example that an investor purchases an option 
on Google stock for $300 a share at a time when it is trading at $295.  
Obviously, if the market price exceeds the exercise price as of the exercise 
date, the option will be exercised.  If the price does not cross that 
threshold, it will not be exercised.   In fact, whenever an option is based on 
a market price or an index, exercise is wholly determinable by reference to 
objective criteria.  In that respect, it is probably more accurate to describe 
such options as formulary rather than discretionary.  All cash-settled 
options by their very nature are formulary.93  Only rarely does option 
exercise in the real world depend upon the subjective motivations of the 
option holder.94
It is ironic in the extreme that a contract’s qualification as a bona 
fide option could be questioned on account of some underlying 
93 For that very same reason, any cash-settled option is essentially a bet on an index, as 
previously noted.  In the case of any index-based options, including options based on a 
price index, the non-discretionary element makes it more like a bet.  
94
 In fact it is hard to conjure up examples of options that are truly subjectively driven.  
One candidate is a popular mortgage product, option adjustable-rate mortgages (“option 
ARMs”), are specifically structured to provide payment flexibility for people with 
varying incomes. In particular, the option ARM gives borrowers as many as four 
payment options each month, which typically include a minimum payment, an interest-
only payment, a traditional payment based on a 30-year term or an accelerated payment 
on a 15-year term.  Since the choice of payment is within the discretion of the mortgagor, 
there is no way for the mortgagee to determine which payment option will be chosen.
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contingency.  An option by its very nature is a contract that is subject to a 
contingency whose resolution will determine whether or not the contract 
will be performed, i.e., whether an underlying property is transferred or 
whether there will be a required payout.95  If the existence of 
preconditions or contingencies circumscribing the exercise of an option 
really operated to prevent the instrument from qualifying as an option, any 
option that is granted out-of-the-money would have a hard time 
qualifying.  Suppose, for example, that someone buys a 3-month call 
option on Intel stock for $51 a share at a time when shares of Intel are 
trading at $47 a share.  While the holder has the right to exercise the 
option and gain control of the shares even when the option is out-of-the-
money, as a practical matter, such an option would never be exercised 
unless and until the stock price rises to the level of the strike price.  For all 
intents and purposes, the option is an instrument whose exercise is subject 
to a contingency.  
G. Trigger Options
1. In General
Even when options are not tied to an index, an option holder 
usually enters into the option precisely because of some specific 
contingency (or contingencies) whose resolution will determine whether 
or not it is in his interest to perform his side of the contract.  The property 
may have a specific ascertainable value to the buyer under certain 
circumstances, for example, upon the happening of an event, or the non-
happening of an event, but would have little or no value to him otherwise.  
After all, why does an option holder enter into an option in the first place?
In general, were it not for the uncertainty arising out of some particular 
contingency, the option holder would presumably have entered into a 
bilateral contract committing himself to the outright purchase or sale of 
the underlying property.  The fact that the option holder chose not to do so 
implies the presence of some underlying contingency the risk of which he 
is willing to pay someone else to bear.  
Options are especially useful when the value of an underlying
property to a prospective buyer depends on the resolution of some 
contingency or contingencies specific to that particular buyer.  The 
particular contingency -- an ability to get a property rezoned, for example, 
will often be mutually known between the two parties transacting, but it 
will not necessarily be stated explicitly in the option contract.  As a rule,
options tend not to be expressly based on the resolution of one or more 
95Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) vs. Comm’r, 125 T.C. No. 
12 (2005)( (“An essential part of any option is that its potential value to the optionee and 
its potential future detriment to the optionor depends on the uncertainty of future events.)
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contingencies, even when the condition is known to both sides. An option 
contract usually just gives the buyer the choice of whether or not to 
proceed, in exchange for an upfront payment, referred to as a premium, 
within a specified time frame, but without explicitly mentioning or 
describing the underlying contingency that was the basis for the option 
contract.  If the hoped-for event fails to happen, such as, for example, a 
job opportunity, or the rezoning of property, the prospective buyer forfeits 
its premium, and is allowed to walk away without incurring any further 
damages.  From the terms of the contract, one might never know what
contingency or contingencies were inhibiting the prospective buyer from 
committing himself to purchasing the property. 
For example, in Southern Coast Corporation v. Commissioner,96
the taxpayer entered into an option to secure a supply of gas in 
anticipation of entering into a contract to sell the gas on to another 
company.  The taxpayer intended to exercise the option only if it managed 
to close the back-end gas sales contract.  The option contract by its terms 
had a fixed expiration date, and made no mention of the underlying 
contingency.   The parties in Southern Coast could just as easily have 
written the relevant condition, the need to secure a customer for the gas, 
right into the contract by tying the right of exercise to the fulfillment of the 
condition. In that case, the option would have been a trigger option, 
exercisable only upon the happening of the specified event.   Trigger 
options are a form of contingent option whose exercise is triggered by 
some specified contingent event.  
Option exercise can be contingent upon virtually anything, 
including whether a price changes by a certain magnitude, or whether a 
hoped-for event has transpired, such as the rezoning of land.  It is a 
relatively easy matter for any conventional option with a fixed exercise 
date to be transformed into a trigger-based option, if there is some 
underlying contingency that is objectively determinable.  As long as there 
is some contingency outside the control of the parties that will determine 
whether or not the contract is exercised, the buyer’s dilemma can be 
usually be expressed in objective terms, which can be written right into the 
contract.  
That the parties did not do so in Southern Coast seems besides the 
point. Ultimately, the anticipated back-end gas sales contract fell through, 
and the taxpayer allowed the option to lapse. Ironically, the taxpayer 
claimed an ordinary, rather than a capital, loss, on the forfeiture of its 
premium, on the grounds that the loss was attributable to the failed 
contingency, rather than the lapse of the option – as if there were any 
substantive difference between these two propositions.  In effect, the
taxpayer was arguing that the contingent nature of the contract obviated its 
96
 17 T.C. 824 (1951).
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status as an option contract, causing it to fall outside the scope of the 
statutory predecessor to section 1234, the statutory rule mandating capital 
loss treatment on the lapse of an option.  As the court explained,
What petitioner would have us do is determine not so much the 
cause of the loss as the anterior reason leading to its decision to 
allow the option to lapse; and in this case to attribute the loss not to 
petitioner's failure to take up its option but to its lack of success in 
obtaining the customer who would make the option profitable. 
Such philosophic speculation would go far to make the section 
impossible of practical administration.
Would the result have been any different had the contract by its 
terms been exercisable only upon the completion of the back-end sales 
contract – in other words, if the contract had explicitly been cast as a 
trigger option contract?  Although one can never be sure, there hardly 
seems to be any real difference between the two types of contracts.  To 
hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance, for no apparent 
reason.
Another example, grounded in real events, may be instructive.  In
the aftermath of the hurricane that devastated the City of New Orleans in 
2005, there was heavy trading in options on the stock of a New Orleans 
based banking company that was scheduled to be acquired by another
bank.  According to published reports, the heavy trading was driven by 
speculation that the acquiring bank might try to lower its price or possibly 
seek to back out of the deal altogether in light of the storm.97 Suppose that
instead of purchasing a traded option, with a traditional fixed exercise 
date, an investor had acquired an option on the company’s stock that was 
exercisable only if the proposed acquisition went through.  How would 
such an option be any different from the conventional options that were
being traded in the market place, whose terms presumably made no 
mention of the proposed acquisition that was driving most of the trading?
The trigger feature does not seem to detract in any way from the 
fundamental nature of the instrument as an option, compared to one that 
has a fixed expiration date. 
2. Time-Based Triggers
Sometimes an option cannot be exercised until a specified period 
of time has elapsed. A contingent event that is certain to occur can hardly 
be labeled a contingency.  Nevertheless, until the prescribed amount of 
time has elapsed, the holder does not have the unlimited power to exercise 
the option at his election.  
97
 Cynthia Schreiber, Options Trading in Hibernia Surges On Uncertainty in Capital 
One Deal, WSJ, September 2, 2005
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A European-style option by definition is one that is exercisable 
only on a specific date (as opposed to an American-style option that is 
exercisable over a period of time).  By implication, a European option is 
one which is exercisable only after the lapse of a period of time.  
Nonetheless, the passage of time, which is objectively determinable and 
beyond the option writer’s control, does not detract from what is otherwise 
clearly an option.  
In Revenue Ruling 89-64,98 the IRS considered whether an option 
that can only be exercised after the lapse of a fixed period of time qualifies 
as an option within the meaning of section 318(a)(4), in which case it 
would be taken into consideration in determining whether a redemption 
qualifies as substantially disproportionate within the meaning of section 
302(b)(2).  In essence, the ruling inquires whether a European option is 
properly viewed as an option.  The answer, it seems, is self-evident, and 
fortunately the IRS agreed.
Sometimes, a trigger event that is specified in an option is destined 
to occur eventually, but at some unknown time.  A good example is an 
option to purchase property that is exercisable only after the death of the 
grantor.  Death implicates a mere timing contingency, rather than an event 
contingency, insofar as death, although uncertain as to timing, is certain to 
occur. In other words, although the threshold date for exercising the option 
is indeterminate, the option will clearly be exercisable at some point in 
time.  In Revenue Ruling 71-265,99 the IRS sensibly concluded that an 
option contract with this kind of contingency does not give rise to a 
current sale or exchange of the underlying real estate, which remains the 
property of the grantor and becomes part of his estate.   The ruling does 
not suggest that the option is anything other than a bona fide option.
3. Early-Exercise Triggers
It is possible for a European style option (i.e., an option which has
a fixed exercise date) to have an early trigger provision, allowing for 
premature exercise upon the happening of certain prescribed events. An 
option of this variety was the subject of a revenue ruling which examined 
whether the occurrence of an early trigger event should be viewed as a 
"modification" for purpose of section 421.100 The restricted stock option 
in issue was exercisable after a fixed date, like most conventional options, 
but the option could be exercised earlier upon the occurrence of any one of 
several specified events, including the employee’s retirement, total and 
98 1989-1 CB 91
99
 1971-1 CB 223.
100 Rev. Rul. 64-230, 1964-2 CB 118.
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permanent disability, or the company’s liquidation, dissolution, or 
participation in a merger. Despite the presence of a trigger feature, the 
classification of the option as an option was never raised as an issue, as the 
Service clearly assumed eligibility for option treatment under section 421.  
As the ruling explained, 
while it may be that an additional benefit will accrue to the 
employee at the time of the occurrence of any of the events 
specified, it accrues under the existing terms of the option rather 
than from a subsequent revision of the option.  Accordingly, it is 
held that the occurrence of any of the specified events which make 
the option exercisable in accordance with its original terms, prior 
to the time when it would otherwise become exercisable, will not 
be considered a modification of the option for purposes of [section 
421 of the Code]. 
4. Pure Trigger Options
The option at issue in Revenue Ruling 64-230 was bound to 
become exercisable no later than the specified exercise date, assuming that 
none of the early trigger provisions had previously been activated.  What 
happens if a trigger option has a lapse date rather than an exercise date, 
meaning that if the event has not happened by that date, then the option 
expires worthless? Such options may be referred to as pure trigger 
options, because the option has a trigger event that may never happen.   
The option will simply lapse, expiring worthless, if not triggered by the 
date specified.  
The credit default swap is by far the most conspicuous form of 
pure trigger option.   A credit default swap allows a party to transfer, in 
exchange for a fee or series of fees, the risk of a decline in credit risk 
associated with a specific reference entity (i.e., Microsoft, Amazon, etc) 
over a fixed term, calculated by reference to the decline in value of the 
reference entity’s debt instruments.  For example, an investor might enter 
into a 5-year CDS with a notional principal amount of $1000 on General 
Motors (“GM”) with a counterparty under which periodically, the 
counterparty pays 100 basis points per annum to the investor on a notional 
amount of $1000.  The contract pays off if, but only if, GM becomes 
insolvent or defaults on any of its material debt obligations.  In that event, 
the Investor either pays the Counterparty the decline in value of a 
reference GM bond or takes delivery of $1000 par amount of a GM bond 
of the counterparty’s choice) in return for $1000.  Otherwise, if the trigger 
is unfulfilled, the contract expires worthless.
These contracts are essentially trigger-type options because they 
only pay off if there is a credit event with respect to the reference obligor 
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(GM) or a debt instrument of the obligor.  In other words, it does not 
suffice for the contract to merely be in-the-money; in order to pay off, one 
of the designated credit events must be triggered as well.  
Trigger options of this nature are in fact more common than is 
generally appreciated.  Stock options granted to employees, for example,
are often subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  Exercise of the option 
may be contingent upon the employee’s continuing employment over a 
specified number of years.  Despite the contingency, there seems to be
little doubt that such options are bona fide options for tax purposes.101
Other examples of trigger options would include clean-up call 
options (if not embedded in some larger agreement).  Clean up calls are 
commonly used in securitizations to allow the servicer to purchase the 
underlying assets in a pool of financial assets and close out the outstanding 
securities when their aggregate principal balance drops below a specified 
percentage, 5 or 10 percent, of their initial aggregate principal balances.  
The calls may only be exercised for administrative reasons, namely, when 
the administrative cost of servicing the interests outweighs the benefits of 
keeping them outstanding.102  In effect, these are event-based options 
which can only be exercised based upon the happening of an event.103
Many corporations have golden parachute arrangements, under 
which certain senior executives are entitled to certain lump-sum payments 
upon both a change in ownership or control and if their employment is 
involuntarily terminated within a specified period of time.  Although they 
are not usually described as options, these contingent-on-control-change 
employment related payments are essentially compensatory cash-settled 
binary options which are also pure trigger options.  
Turning to the world of sports, when the Boston Red Sox baseball 
team signed All-Star pitcher Curt Schilling in 2003 to a 2-year contract, 
the pitcher reportedly granted the team an option for a 3rd year that would 
automatically be triggered if the Red Sox were to win the Major League 
World Series during the duration of his employment.  When the Red Sox 
swept the St. Louis Cardinals in the 2004 World Series, the option for an 
additional year was triggered and automatically deemed exercised.  
Assuming that the Red Sox made a non-refundable option premium to the 
pitcher for the rights to a third year of his services at a specified rate of 
compensation, the contract appears to be a bona fide trigger option. 
101 Cramer v. Comm’r., 64 F.3d 1406,(9th Cir. 1995), aff’g 101 T.C. 225 (1993) 
(Taxpayer could only exercise the option in 20% increments in each of the following five 
years, and only so long as he remained employed by IMED).
102
 See Reg. Sec. 1.860G-2(j).
103
 Admittedly, the relevant trigger resembles a time-based trigger, since the principal 
should decline over time.  However, it is always possible that the issuer will default 
before that time, so it would probably be a reach to call it an inevitability.
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The tax consequences arising in connection with an ill-fated trigger 
option was the subject of an opinion of the Tax Court in Harry L. Booker 
v. Commissioner.104 Booker involved the tax treatment of an amount that 
was received in settlement of a threatened lawsuit to recover certain 
expenses that arose out of a breached trigger option agreement.  The 
relevant option provided a retailer with the right to lease the premises 
adjacent to his store.  At the time that the option was granted, the relevant 
property was occupied by another commercial tenant, and the option did 
not set a fixed exercise date.  Instead, the right of exercise would be 
triggered if and when the neighboring tenant chose to vacate his space.  As 
it happened, the grantor subsequently sold the building before the 
neighbor’s departure, and when the option holder subsequently sought to 
enforce his option, the new owner declined.  
Ultimately, the court concluded that the settlement proceeds 
constituted ordinary income. However, in the course of its analysis, the 
court clearly assumed that the relevant contract was an option contract:
Here, the basis of the out-of-court recovery was an asserted breach 
of an option contract. The damages represented profits which 
would have been earned in the event the option had been exercised 
and reimbursement for additional rental expense anticipated 
because of the acquisition of new quarters.
The prospect that the underlying contract might not be a bona fide option 
does not appear to have been considered by the court or either of the two 
parties, nor does there appear to be any good reason for them to have done 
so. 
5. Correlation Effects and Multiple Contingencies
In some situations, the trigger event causing the option to become 
exercisable may be correlated with the option’s having intrinsic value.  In 
other words, the option may be out-of-the-money during the non-trigger 
period, and at the very moment in which the right of exercise is triggered, 
the option ripens into an in-the-money option.  For example, consider the 
hypothetical option scenario discussed earlier with respect to Next Wave’s 
disputed licensing rights, involving an American-style option with a fixed 
expiration date.   Although no contingency was explicitly stated in the 
terms of the option, the option would not have been exercised unless Next 
Wave were to prevail in its litigation.  Suppose, however, that the option 
by its terms could only be exercised after a final determination of a court 
of law vindicating Next Wave’s rights to the disputed license, and would 
otherwise lapse by a fixed date.  Since it was possible that no such 
104
 27 T.C. 932 (1957).  
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favorable determination would ever be made, an option which contained 
these terms would be a pure trigger option.
Assuming that Next Wave prevailed in the litigation, the property 
rights would presumably increase in value from $5 million to $10 million 
because the rights would at that point no longer be under any legal cloud.  
However, the same event that caused the property to increase in value also 
happens to be the option trigger, so at that very same moment, the option 
would for the first time become fully exercisable.  On the one hand, the 
option is not exercisable until the stated contingency is triggered, but at 
the very instance in which that happens, the option will be in-the-money 
and the holder will be economically bound to exercise the option.  Since 
the contingency cannot be favorably resolved without also causing the 
option to be in-the-money, there is no risk that the option will be 
unexercisable at any time when it happens to be in-the-money.  In short, 
there seems to be little reason economically to distinguish this kind of 
pure trigger option from an option that has a clearly defined expiration 
date.
It is also possible, however, that the prescribed trigger event may 
be wholly uncorrelated with whether and the extent to which an option is 
in-the-money.  A credit default swap, for example, will often be in-the-
money as soon as the creditworthiness of the obligor begins to deteriorate, 
as the value of the underlying debt instrument should at that point begin to 
decline below the par value of the instrument.  Nevertheless, the holder’s 
right of exercise is circumscribed by the requirement that there must be 
some credit event in order to trigger exercise.  In this situation, the option 
holder’s right of exercise is clearly constrained by the happening, or non-
happening, of an extraneous contingency.  Is this type of contingent option 
still properly viewed as an option?   The question implicated here is 
whether it is permissible for an option to be subject to a dual contingency, 
namely that an option must not only move into-the-money, but, in 
addition, some other condition, uncorrelated with the in-the-money status, 
is fulfilled as well.
By analogy, options on publicly-traded property appear to 
implicate only a single contingency, namely the price of the underlying 
commodity on the delivery date.  Suppose, for example, that an investor 
buys an option on natural gas at $10 per mmbtu at a time when gas is 
trading at $9.30.  On the surface, it appears that the option is subject to a 
single contingency, namely whether or not within the designated time 
frame the price of natural gas appreciates sufficiently to warrant exercise 
at the $10 exercise price.  
The appearance of a single contingency in this setting is highly 
misleading.  Market pricing by its nature generally masks a myriad 
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number of contingencies.  In a liquid market with public trading, prices 
posted for the underlying property provide a mechanism for assimilating a 
wide range of information in the world-at-large that implicates one or 
more contingencies or variables that will impact whether or not the option 
is worth exercising.  The price level is simply a proxy for the happening, 
or not, of any number of fortuitous events.  One of the so- called marvels 
of the price system is how it is able to accommodate a virtually limitless 
number of contingencies, which is what makes the price mechanism so 
economically efficient.105
What, after all, determines prices in the natural gas market?  In 
general, gas prices may be impacted by a confluence of events, including, 
but not necessarily limited to, pipeline receipts, weather statistics, rig 
counts, power plant outages, nuclear capacity utilization, and hydroelectric 
dam water levels, among other factors.  Prices in the crude oil market, for 
their part, may be affected by emerging demand from China and Third 
World countries, worldwide economic growth, the level of OPEC 
production, the amount of spare capacity, crude oil inventories, refining 
capacity, not to mention political events.  Sometimes cataclysmic political 
or meteorological events can cause a sudden and sharp increase in prices, 
such as, the Iranian revolution in 1979 or more recently, damage sustained 
to oil rigs from Hurricane Katrina.  Bond prices, for their part, are 
impacted by supply and demand, fluctuations in interest rates, foreign 
exchange rates, prepayment rates and rating-agency analysis, among other 
factors.  The point is that for virtually any commodity, one can recite a 
similar litany of forces potentially impacting prices and consequently, 
whether an option on the commodity will be exercised or not.
In the case of non-traded options which are motivated by a single 
contingency not expressly written into the contract, the option holder 
possesses the right not to exercise the option for any other reason, 
including reasons that he may not have been contemplating when he 
originally entered into the contract.  In other words, although the parties 
may have originally had in mind a single contingency, contractually there 
are no such limitations on the number of reasons for which an option 
105
 The notion that a whole host of contingencies are implicit or embedded in any price or index 
was the predicate for Friedrich Hayek’s model of how the economic market pools information so 
efficiently despite its decentralized character, its lack of a master coordinator. Hayek's big claim 
about the price system, one of the greatest insights of the Twentieth Century, was that it 
aggregates widely dispersed information and tastes. In particular, Hayek claimed that any "price" 
is a signaling system that captures the information and tastes of many people, in a way that will 
outperform the judgments of even the best experts. No matter how many variables are in play, a 
social or economic system can be rational and efficient, even without planning.  The price 
mechanism coordinates the economic activity of millions of individuals, urging them to divert 
resources to where rising prices indicate an excess of demand over supply, or to remove resources 
from unproductive uses. For this reason, he described it as a "marvel." Friedrich Von Hayek, “The 
Use of Knowledge in Society,”American Economic Review 35 (September 1945): 519-30.
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holder might ultimately choose not to proceed with the underlying 
transaction.  Suppose, for example, that a buyer takes an option on real 
property located in another part of the country in the hope of getting a job 
offer.  Suppose further that he gets the offer, but in the interim, he decides 
not to take it because his elderly parents have taken ill.  He still has the 
right to decline the option, and can do so without having to provide any 
explanation or incur any liability.  
This example shows why there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between options burdened by a single contingency and 
those that are burdened by multiple contingencies.  In fact, our analysis to 
this point has demonstrated how the presence of an underlying 
contingency goes to the very essence of what makes an option an option.  
Under the circumstances, on what basis should we deny option status to a 
contract whose performance is dependent on multiple contingencies?  
What difference does it make whether performance by an option holder 
with respect to its side of the contract is dependent upon one factor, two 
factors, seven factors, or a hundred factors?
In fact, there are abundant examples of options in the financial 
marketplace that implicate multiple contingencies.   Compound 
contingencies arise whenever a payment reflects the difference between 
two contingent amounts.  An option may provide for payments based on 
the difference between two floating-rate indices as applied to the same 
dollar amount.  For example, an option that pays amounts determined by 
the excess, if any, of 3-month LIBOR over 3-month U.S. Commercial 
Paper rates on each payment date implicates dual contingencies.   
Cross-rate foreign currency options, which are options to purchase 
or sell foreign currency at an exercise price that is denominated in another 
foreign currency, implicate dual contingencies as well.  For example, if a 
United States investor acquires an option to purchase Japanese yen at an 
exercise price denominated in Euros, the investor will be exposed to 
fluctuations in the price of both Euros and yen.  In other words, exercise of 
the option is contingent upon two variables.  A LIBOR-contingent foreign 
currency option is a foreign currency option whose payoff only occurs if a 
pre-specified interest rate falls within a certain range at maturity.
The New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) makes available 
“crack spread” options contracts, including one for the spread between the 
price of heating oil futures and light, sweet crude oil futures, and another 
that is based on the spread between the New York Harbor unleaded 
gasoline and light, sweet crude.   Such products are sought after by
petroleum refiners, for example, which must navigate between two 
separate markets: the raw materials they have to purchase and the finished 
products they offer for sale. Refiners find themselves at enormous risk 
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when crude oil prices rise more than refined product prices, thus 
narrowing the so-called crack spread, which measures the spread in the 
prices of these two products.  
A whole class of options referred to as knock-out options or 
knock-in options (or barrier options) are path-dependent options whose 
payoff depends on whether an underlying asset’s price reaches a certain 
level during a certain period of time.  An option is knocked-out or 
knocked-in if the underlying interest reaches or crosses a specified barrier 
at any time during the life of the option.  Options of this variety regularly 
trade in the over-the-counter market and because they feature compound 
contingencies, they tend to be less expensive then the corresponding 
regular options.  
An out barrier or knock-out option pays off only if two conditions 
are simultaneously met; the underlying interest finishes in the money and 
the specified barrier is never crossed before expiration.  As long as the 
barrier of a knock-out option is not crossed, it functions just like a 
standard option of the same type with the same strike and expiration.  
However, if the underlying interest crosses the barrier, the option expires 
worthless, even if it would otherwise finish in-the-money.  For example, it 
is possible to buy options on credit default swaps, which are European 
style knock-out options.  The holder has an option to enter into a credit 
default swap, meaning it has the right to buy or sell protection on a 
specified reference entity for a predetermined period, typically five years. 
However, the option will generally knock- out if the reference entity 
defaults during the life of the option (i.e. before the underlying credit 
default swap takes effect).106
An in barrier or knock-in option pays off if both (i) the underlying 
interest finishes in-the-money and (ii) if the specified barrier is crossed 
sometime before expiration.  If the underlying interest never crosses the 
barrier, the option expires worthless, even if it would otherwise finish in-
the-money.  One such product that has been used in the electric power 
sector, a so-called nuclear outage contingent call option, entails such dual 
contingencies.  The knock-in event for these options is a covered outage of 
a specified nuclear unit.  If knocked-in, these options pay an amount for 
each peak hour during a knock-in event equal to the product of the 
notional quantity and the excess of the floating price over the strike price 
(e.g. $100 per MWh.)  A covered outage would typically occur with 
respect to a particular unit if the percentage of power reported in the plant 
status report of the U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission for that unit for 
a particular day is off by 25% or more.  
106
 This product is essentially an option on an option, the strangeness of which poses no 
pedagogical issues.
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Basket options, which are options whose payoff is dependent upon 
the value of a portfolio (basket) of assets, accommodate as many 
contingencies as there are assets in the basket.  The underlying assets may 
be individual stocks or stock indices or currencies.  Citibank’s Private 
Bank, for example, links a call option to a basket of Asian currencies, the 
Korean won, the Thailand Baht, the Indian rupee, the Taiwan dollar and 
the Singapore dollar.  In return for a premium of 5 to 10% of the face 
value of the option, usually about $1 million, investors participate in the 
upside if the value of the currencies increases, but risk losing their 
premium if the value is lower at the end of the contract.
Standard & Poor's 500 index options, whose pay off is contingent 
upon the stock performance of 500 separate companies, resemble options 
in every respect.  Structured as either “call” options or “put” options and 
having terms ranging from three weeks to five years, they can be exercised 
only on expiration (that is, they are European-style options), and they can 
be settled only in cash. The holder of a call option has a right to receive 
cash based on the extent to which the index on the exercise date is above a 
pre-stated value. The writer of a call option has an obligation to pay cash 
determined in the same way. A put option resembles a call option except 
that a holder's right to receive cash and a writer's obligation to pay cash 
are based on the extent to which the index on the exercise date is below a 
pre-stated value.  The IRS has ruled favorably that options based on a 
stock index are treated as options subject to section 1256.107
V. OVERLAP BETWEEN OPTIONS AND FINANCIAL SWAPS
A. The Controversy Over Characterization of Credit Default Swaps
The preceding section explains why credit default swaps are pure 
trigger options which should be respected as bona fide options for tax 
purposes.  The trigger event for exercise of these options is the occurrence 
of a credit event, which generally includes a reference debtor’s failure to 
make payments on an obligation when due, or the reference entity’s 
insolvency, or bankruptcy.  The specified issuer is typically not a party to 
the credit derivatives contract.  If the contract pays off, the writer pays the 
decline in value below par of a reference obligation of the same notional 
amount.  
As previously described, a credit default swap typically requires 
the buyer to make periodic payments for a period of time, which are based 
on a fixed number of basis points (typically, the spread over Treasuries of 
a reference credit’s actual debt obligations) applied to a notional principal 
amount.  Because of the provision for periodic premiums, many 
107 See Rev. Rul. 94-63, 1994-2 CB 188. 
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commentators believe that, whether or not these products satisfy the 
criteria for an option, credit default swaps appear to fall within the scope 
of the definition of a notional principal contract.108  Since some of the tax 
rules governing notional principal contracts are different from those 
applicable to options, particularly with respect to timing and character of 
income and expense, the question arises as to whether credit default swaps
are properly regarded as options or whether they are more properly 
regarded as notional principal contracts for tax purposes.
A notional principal contract is tax jargon for what the rest of the 
world calls a financial swap.  The tax law definition of a notional principal 
contract includes any financial instrument that provides for the payment of 
amounts by one party to another at specified intervals calculated by 
reference to a "specified index" applied to a notional principal amount in 
exchange for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar 
amounts.109  The reference to the payment of "amounts" at "specified 
intervals" appears to distinguish such swaps from options, since options 
generally do not require either party to make multiple payments at 
specified intervals.  Moreover, regulations specifically provide that 
options, other than swaptions (options to enter into notional principal 
contracts) and caps and floors, are excluded from the definition of notional 
principal contracts.  
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible for options to provide for 
periodic premiums payable over time, rather than a single upfront 
premium, and in those circumstances, there is some potential for overlap 
between these two product categories.  For example, a multi-period cash-
settled option that is issued for premiums payable in installments at a rate 
equal to LIBOR times a notional amount would appear to qualify as an 
option for federal tax purposes as well as a notional principal contract.  So 
too would a credit default swap.
Tax professionals have never quite been able get their arms around 
the exact nature of credit default swaps, alternately describing these 
products as arguably options or notional principal contracts, despite doubts 
about each label.  The tax definition of a notional principal contract results 
in what is at best an awkward fit for these products insofar a protection 
seller may never, and in fact, usually does not, make a payment in the 
other direction, and if it does do so, settlement is on an actual rather than a 
notional basis.  At the same time, tax professionals have been united in 
arguing strongly against characterization as either guarantees or insurance, 
since the latter two categories could result in significant withholding or 
excise taxes on cross-border payments, while the former two would not.110
108
 See note 5.
109
 Reg. Sec. 1.446-3(c).
110
 See note 5.
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The IRS has received several commentaries from leading commentators 
urging the Service to adopt the position that no withholding or excise taxes 
apply with respect to credit default swaps if payments are made to foreign
counterparties, on the grounds that these products are properly classified 
as either options or notional principal contracts.  
Since neither one of these product categories would result in any 
withholding or excise taxes due in respect of cross-border payments on
these products, resolution of solely the withholding tax issue would not 
seem to require the IRS to choose between these two product categories in 
classifying credit default swaps.  It would appear, then, that by arguing in 
the alternative that credit default swaps can wear either one of these two 
labels, the case against assessing withholding taxes on cross-border CDS 
is mutually reinforcing.  
The problem with this approach, however, is that it tends to cast 
doubt on whether these products deserve to be classified under either one 
of these categories, thereby undermining the ultimate conclusion that is 
being sought, namely that these instruments should unequivocally be 
exempt from withholding or excise tax.111 In other words, the ambiguous 
classification of these instruments, far from mitigating any cross-border
tax issues, may in fact be exacerbating them.  Under the circumstances, it 
makes greater sense to try to fundamentally resolve the option/ notional 
principal contract overlap both generally, and with respect to credit default 
swaps in particular, by focusing on the inherent economic differences 
between these two product categories.  Insofar as it can be proven that 
these products plainly qualify as options, as this paper has amply 
demonstrated to this point, and that, further, the notional principal contract 
label is in fact an improper fit economically, then the withholding tax 
issue may be safely put to rest without any reservations.  
B. Options and Bullet Swaps
As a prelude to delving further into the fundamental economics of 
notional principal contracts, some general background on financial swaps 
is in order.  A financial swap generally refers to a contract between two 
parties providing for the contemporaneous exchange of cash flows based 
on changes in the value or level of one or more interest rates, currencies, 
commodities, securities, or other asset categories applied to a specified 
notional quantity or amount of the underlying asset category.  In a typical 
interest rate swap, for example, one party makes periodic payments to the 
111
 In fact, IRS officials have reportedly told practitioners informally that no future 
guidance would be forthcoming any time soon pending resolution of the classification 
issue.  See Tax Officials Discuss Financial Products At NYSBA Annual Meeting, 2006 
TNT 18-6 (January 26, 2006)
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other party equal to an interest rate index (such as LIBOR) times a 
notional principal amount in exchange for periodic payments equal to a 
fixed rate times the same notional principal amount. In a typical 
commodities swap, one party makes periodic payments to the other party 
equal to the monthly average of settlement prices for a specified 
commodity, such as a natural gas futures contracts on the NYMEX, times 
a specified quantity (i.e., mm btus of natural gas) in exchange for a fixed 
rate of payments times the same quantity of the commodity.
In practice, as long as the parties’ payment obligations to one 
another arise on the same day, as is typically the case, the counter parties 
“net” their obligations against one another so that only the net amount due 
from one party to the other actually changes hands.112 Whenever there are 
a series of such exchanges at specified intervals, as is commonly the case, 
the contract will be referred to here as a serial swap,113 but when the 
contract contemplates only a single such exchange, the product is often 
referred to as a bullet swap.  The tax definition of a notional principal 
contract expressly contemplates only serial swaps.  The term does not 
literally cover bullet swaps, since bullet swaps refer to a one-off 
exchange.114
In order to properly address the potential overlap between an 
option and a notional principal contract, it is important to begin with more 
of an apples-to-apples comparison, by addressing how a simple cash-
settled option differs from a simple bullet swap.  As noted above, a bullet 
swap is a contract that provides for a single exchange of payments at 
maturity based on some notional amount and a specified index.   We will 
begin by discussing how a simple bullet swap differs from a cash-settled 
option, and then proceed to a comparison between an option and a series 
of such swaps, which encompasses what the tax world calls a notional 
principal contract.
112 See generally John C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 
Banking L.J. 638 (1995).   
113
 The market convention is to refer to serial swaps as simply swaps.  This paper uses the term 
serial swaps to avoid confusion with bullet swaps.
114 Despite the similar economics between a notional principal contract as defined in 
section 1.446-3 and a series of bullet swaps, the payments made under the former are 
covered by the regulation, whereas the payments under the other are not.  The regulations 
define a notional principal contract as a “financial instrument that provides for the 
payment of amounts by one party to another at specified intervals calculated by reference 
to a specified index upon a notional principal amount, in exchange for specified 
consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts.” Section 1.446-3(c)(1)(i).  Bullet 
swaps are not literally covered by the definition of NPC’s because there are no 
“payments” made at “specified intervals.”  See also, Prop. Reg. section 1.1234A-1(c)(2) 
(providing for distinct character rules on settlement).
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As it happens, cash-settled options differ from bullet swaps in a 
fundamental way.  Swaps result in payments reflecting changes in either 
direction in the valuation of a specified asset or index.  An option results 
in a payment being made only if prices or an index moves in a single 
direction. In particular, in the case of an option, one party grants the other 
party (in consideration of a premium payment) the right to receive a 
payment equal to the amount by which an index either exceeds (in the case 
of a call) or is less than (in the case of a put) a specified strike price.  
Otherwise, no payment is made and the option expires worthless.  
The contrasting economics can be illustrated if the range of 
possible outcomes for each of these two products is plotted along a graph.  
Options have a non-linear payout profile, reflecting the fact that there is a 
wide range of possible outcomes in which the value of the instrument is 
zero.  In contrast, swaps are instruments which have a linear payout 
profile, since the product pays out regardless of the direction in which the
underlying price or index moves.115
These contrasting economics help bring to the fore another related
difference between an option and a bullet swap.  An option, unlike a swap,
is a limited risk instrument.  As such, it economically requires the payment 
of a premium.  Options require the payment of premiums because options 
by their nature are asymmetrical, or one-sided bets.  One side fixes its 
exposure to either the upside or downside price movements in exchange 
for the amount paid (the premium), and assumes unlimited exposure to 
price movements in the opposite direction.  An option, in short, is 
fundamentally an imbalanced contract because one side obtains potential 
benefits not available to the other.  
Bullet swaps, by contrast, and other financial contracts involve 
symmetrical or dual wagers.  A swap by its nature will always pay out on 
one side or the other by reference to the excess or shortfall of the variable 
leg to the other (except for the rare instances when the two legs happen to 
exactly equal one another on the settlement date).  In that respect, swaps 
by their nature tend to have mutual contemporaneous payment obligations.  
A contracting party will enter into a financial swap with an unrelated party 
only if the present value of the financial asset it thereby acquires is at least 
equal to the present value of its matching liability.  Since there are mutual 
contingent payment obligations on a swap, the contract is inherently 
balanced and no upfront payments are required upon entry into an on-
market contract.  
This distinction between options and bullet swaps parallels the 
traditional difference between options and bilateral executory contracts 
generally.  Options are one-sided contracts which require an upfront 
115
 In other words, the contrast is between a bent line and a straight line.
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payment at the inception to balance the two positions.  Swaps have 
bilateral payment responsibilities, and do not require any upfront 
payments unless the contract is an off-market contract.116
A swap requiring an initial premium payment is an off-market 
swap, which arises only under certain limited circumstances.117 If the 
payments to be exchanged on the settlement date are not equivalent at the 
outset, then the party whose payment obligation is lesser will have to 
make a compensating payment, often at the inception of the contract.  
Since that payment, economically, is essentially a balancing payment to 
offset the mismatch between payment obligations on the settlement date, 
the regulations attempt to relate any such upfront payment back to the time 
period in which it properly belongs, by precluding the upfront payment 
from being taken into income or deducted at the time of payment.118
Unlike a swap, the single cash premium payment made by the 
option holder does not merely represent the present value of a schedule of 
fixed-rate amounts.  Rather, the premium necessarily takes into account 
the fact that, in contrast to a swap, the option holder will receive no 
offsetting payments from the other party (the "writer") if the level of the 
specified floating rate on the measurement date is less (more, in the case 
of a put option) than the scheduled fixed rate. As previously noted, one 
type of option, a call option, pays out only if the variable leg proves to be 
greater than the fixed leg, -- but not otherwise.  A put option pays out only 
if the fixed leg proves to greater than the variable -- but not otherwise.  In 
either case, if the underlying contingency fails, no payment is made by 
either side and the option expires worthless.  
A corollary to the principle that options economically require 
premiums, whereas a swap does not, is that a swap, like most bilateral 
executory contracts, should have zero value at the time of its signing.  An 
option, by contrast, always has positive value to the holder once he has 
paid a premium for the contract.
The precise nature of the relationship between options and swaps 
can be explained by showing how the option exercise price in a cash-
settled option corresponds to the fixed leg of a swap.  When an option is 
116
 See, e.g.,W. A. Drake, Inc., 3 T.C. 33, 37 (1944), affd. 145 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 
1944); Geo. S. Carter, 36 T.C. 128, 130 (1961).
117
 In particular, parties may enter into off-market swaps where (i) a party desires to 
match an existing asset or liability, and therefore wishes to pay (or receive) fixed-rate 
amounts that do not correspond to current market rates, or (ii) a party wishes to assume 
(or induce another party to assume) an existing swap position that no longer reflects 
market rates.
118
 The analysis uses reasoning by analogy, since technically, the notional principal 
contract regulations do not cover a bullet swap.
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cash-settled, the option writer simply pays the option holder the excess, if 
any, of the value of the underlying property over the exercise price, so the 
exercise price need not literally be paid.  If the exercise price exceeds the 
value of the underlying property on the settlement date, no payment is 
required in the case of an option.  
No payment is required because the option holder has previously 
fixed his downside risk exposure by paying an upfront premium.  By 
contrast, payment of that differential would be required if the product were 
a swap, because a swap consists of reciprocal options.  If, in lieu of 
entering into a swap, the parties were to literally enter into equal and 
identical offsetting cash-settled options, no premium payment would be 
required, because the two premiums would offset one another.  This
observation is consistent with the fact that parties to a swap generally do 
not pay one another a premium.  
Based on the foregoing analysis, there is a simple and 
straightforward relationship between a bullet swap and an option that 
helps illuminate the difference between the two products.  A bullet swap 
may be viewed as a single instrument that consists of a pair of equal and 
offsetting cash-settled options, one a put and the other a call option, 
having the exact same strike price.  This analogy is consistent with put-
call theory in finance which holds that a forward contract consists of the 
combination of a put and a call option having identical terms.  Since a 
swap is itself a forward contract, albeit one that is financially settled, with 
no actual exchange of the notional, applying the put-call theory to a swap 
yields the equivalency between a swap with a pair of identical options.
The aforementioned relationship between an option and a bullet 
swap can be illustrated by a series of related examples.  
Classic Option.  In a classic option transaction, assume that on 
January 1, 2000, H pays W a $30 premium for the right to purchase 10 
widgets for $100 apiece, for a total of $1000, exercisable on December 31 
of the same year.  Assuming that the option calls for cash settlement in 
lieu of physical settlement, W must pay H on December 31 the increase, if 
any in the value of 10 widgets over the $1000 contract price.  This 
contract, as noted, is a classic option. (Example 1)
Mirror Image of Classic Option.  Suppose, alternatively, that W 
pays H a $30 premium for the right to sell H 10 widgets for $100 apiece, 
exercisable on December 31 of the same year.  Assuming that the option 
calls for cash settlement in lieu of physical settlement, H must pay W on 
December 31 the decrease, if any in the value of 10 widgets below the 
$1000 contract price.  This contract, too, is a classic option, and what’s 
more, it is a mirror image of the option in Example 1.  If the parties were 
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to enter into a single contract or arrangement that includes both of the 
foregoing options, the premiums would net to zero and the parties would 
have essentially created the economic equivalent of a bullet swap.  
(Example 2)
Classic Bullet Swap. By merging the parallel options in examples 
1 and 2 above into a single contract, the overall transaction can be 
reformulated using traditional swap parlance as a fixed-for-floating swap.  
H would be required to pay W the value of 10 widgets in one year based 
on their $100 forward price at the time that the option is entered into, and 
in return, W would be required to pay H the spot market value of the 
widgets as of that date. Since the two legs of the contract have equal value, 
no premium payment would be required.  The resulting contract, 
corresponding to a combination of the contracts in the first two examples,
is a classic bullet swap, providing as it does for mutual wagers.  (Example 
3)
Off-Market Bullet Swap. A conventional bullet swap can itself be
reconstructed so as to require an upfront payment, but doing so does not 
change its fundamental economics, and thus should not affect its 
classification. Going back to the preceding examples, suppose that H’s 
financial obligation under the terms of the bullet swap is altered so that H 
is required to pay $90 as an upfront premium and another $900 on the 
settlement date, which is equivalent to having to pay $1000 in one year 
based on 10% compounding.  (Example 4.)
Notwithstanding the presence of an upfront payment, the product is 
still a bullet swap, not an option.  True options are asymmetrical contracts, 
with one side having limited risk exposure in exchange for the premium.  
Accordingly, in analyzing a particular financial contract for product 
classification purposes, the relevant question should be whether the two 
sides have equal and offsetting risk exposures, so that the contract contains 
mutual wagers, as in a swap, or whether the implicit bet is entirely one-
sided, in the sense that one side’s downside exposure is limited in a 
meaningful way to a fraction of the potential downside exposure.  In the 
current example, while H is required to pay $90 upfront, its downside risk 
exposure is not limited to the amount of the upfront premium.  In fact, if 
the value of widgets declines by more than $100, H will be required to 
make a net payment to W.  If the contract were truly an option, H would 
have no additional downside exposure beyond the initial $90 payment.  
Accordingly, a bullet swap cannot be transformed into an option by the 
simple expedient of requiring a portion of H’s future payment obligation 
to be made at the inception of the contract.
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C. Options and Serial Swaps
Having addressed the fundamental differences economically
between an option and a bullet swap, it should be possible to demonstrate 
the fundamental differences between an option and a series of swaps, i.e.,
what is referred to as a notional principal contract. Consider the following 
examples.
Option with Periodic Premiums, but Single Settlement.  
Assume the same set of facts as the classic option described in Example 1 
above except that (i) the option to purchase 10 widgets is exercisable over 
a period of 5 years, rather than a single year, and that (ii) the option calls 
for H to make annual $3 premium payments every January 1 for as long as 
the option remains outstanding. (Example 5)
Option Series (Periodic Premiums and Periodic Settlements).
Assume, as in Example 5, that the contract calls for annual $3 premiums 
over a 5-year period, but that every December 31 is a separate net cash 
settlement date, so that W pays H the excess of the value of 10 widgets 
over the $1000 contract price at each year-end over the course of 5 years.  
(Example 6)
Serial Swaps. Finally, assume that the fixed-for-floating exchange 
of payments described in the Example 3 bullet swap is made not just once 
on December 31, but is undertaken every year for 5 years.  (Example 7)
When option premiums are payable periodically, but there is still 
only one right of exercise, or one single settlement, as in Example 5, the 
case law is clear that the contract should still be regarded as an option.119
An option is an asymmetrical contract in which one party has fixed its 
downside liability.  The fact that the premiums are payable periodically 
rather than as a single upfront payment does not detract from the 
asymmetrical nature of the contract.  (Of course, if the option premiums 
collectively are sufficiently large so as to give rise to a deep-in-the-money 
option, the contract may be reclassified as a sales contract.)
In Koch v. Commissioner,120 a case which involved periodic option 
premiums, the question for the court was whether the contract under 
review should be viewed as consisting of a series of options, each with 
reference to one of the periodic premiums (analogous to Example 6), or 
whether the entire contract constituted only a single option that provided 
for periodic premiums (analogous to Example 5).  The court concluded 
that the payments in the case before it were made to keep a five-year 
119 Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 195, aff’d, 99 F.2d 919 (4th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied 307 U.S. 630 (1939).
120 67 TC 71 (1976), acq
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option in effect, meaning that, as in Example 5, there was a single option 
and not a series of three-month options. In short, the payments received 
under the agreements were in return for the continuing right of the option 
holder to purchase the property
When an option provides for physical settlement by conveyance of 
an underlying property, the option would normally lapse as soon as there 
has been a single physical settlement, since once the property has been 
conveyed, no further settlements are possible.  In that event, the contract 
clearly consists of a single option.  In the case of a cash-settled option, 
however, it is possible to have multiple settlements.  The distinction 
between the options in Examples 5 and 6 ultimately depends on whether 
the contract contemplates a single settlement or multiple settlements.  
An option begins to more closely resemble a series of swaps when 
there are not merely multiple premium payments, but also a series of 
exchanges or settlements, as in Example 6. However, a series of cash-
settled options bears no closer resemblance to a serial swap (i.e., 
consisting of periodic exchanges) than a classic option (single premium) 
bears to a bullet swap.  The option described in Example 6 provides for a 
series of one-way payments, or for no payment at all if the index moves in 
the opposite direction.  In short, the contract is a classic asymmetrical 
contract in the nature of an option.  Example 7 by contrast, provides for 
payments from one party to the other no matter which direction prices 
move in, which renders that contract a true swap contract.  A swap 
contract, by its nature, is a symmetrical contract.  
With respect to options that provide for periodic premiums, on 
what basis can we distinguish between a notional principal contract and an 
option?  Based on the foregoing analysis, the relevant standard is the same 
as the benchmark used for differentiating between a bullet swap and an 
option.  In sum, while swaps have as a primary characteristic the bilateral 
exchange of rights and obligations, options have economic features that 
clearly distinguish between the roles assigned to each of the contracting 
parties.  One product is a limited risk, symmetrical, contract and the other 
is not.  The former is properly viewed as an option, while the latter 
generally falls within the rubric of notional principal contracts.
D. Options, Caps and Floors
These contrasting features furnish an appropriate means for 
relieving the existing tension between notional principal contracts and 
options in a way that is both simple to understand and easy to apply.  
There is an important exception, however, to the proposition that notional 
principal contracts are symmetrical contracts.  Caps and floors (described 
more fully below) are governed by the notional principal contract rules 
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and not by the rules governing options for no apparent reason other than 
that the regulations expressly provide for such treatment.  The result is 
surprising because caps and floors bear a much strong economic 
resemblance to options than to conventional notional principal contracts. 
 
Under a typical interest rate cap, one party (the "purchaser") pays 
an initial "premium" amount in exchange for an agreement by the other 
party (the "writer") to make a series of payments equal to the excess on 
each payment date of a floating-rate index over a specified fixed rate, each 
as applied to a notional principal amount.   If, on a scheduled payment 
date, the relevant floating rate is less than the specified fixed rate, no 
payment is made. An interest rate floor, conversely, requires the writer to 
make payments based on the amount by which a floating rate is less than 
the specified fixed rate. If, on a scheduled payment date, the relevant 
floating rate is less, in the case of a cap, or more, in the case of a floor, 
than the specified fixed rate, no payment is made.
The economics of caps and floors are identical to option 
economics.  Caps and floors, unlike swaps, typically are structured to 
provide for an initial premium payment.  As a result, the purchaser of a 
cap or floor normally is viewed as having a tax basis in the contract.
Moreover, as interest rates rise, the value of a cap contract 
increases in value, just as would the value of a put option on a fixed-rate 
debt instrument.  If interest rates decline, the loss to the cap holder is 
limited to its initial premium payment. Like the holder of an option, the 
purchaser of a cap therefore has an unlimited potential for gain, and a risk 
of loss limited to its initial premium payment. Likewise, the writer of a 
cap has the unlimited loss and limited gain potential characteristics of an 
option writer.
These products are economically analogous to the option described 
in Example 6 above, except that the unlike a series of separately stated 
options, the initial premium paid for a cap or floor contract is often stated 
as a single lump sum.  The timing of income from caps and floors under 
the Regulations differs from the taxation of options.  Since regulations 
require amortization of upfront payments received in respect of notional 
principal contracts,121 these upfront premiums must be amortized over the 
term of the contract.122 In particular, the premium allocable to each period 
on a cap or floor is required to be recognized on a ratable daily basis over 
121 Reg. Sec. 1.446-3(f).
122 Reg. Sec. 1.446-3(f)(2)(iv) requires that non-periodic payments under a cap or floor 
contract be allocated over the contract's term "in accordance with the price of a series of 
cash-settled option contracts." The amount of a non-periodic payment allocated to each 
deemed option under the cap or floor then is taken into account (as income or deduction) 
only in the period during which that deemed option is scheduled to expire. Straight-line 
and "accelerated" amortization methods are specifically disallowed.
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that period. Under the tax rules applicable to options, option premium is 
generally recognized upon the lapse, exercise, or other termination of the 
option (except in the case of a party who takes delivery of the optioned 
property, who generally realizes income or loss attributable to the option 
as income or loss from such property). 
The character of income or loss from a cap or floor also differs 
from the treatment of options, with payments under caps and floors 
generally qualifying for ordinary treatment. Accordingly, taxpayers 
otherwise indifferent to entering into, for example, a three-year cap or a 
set of three options effectively may elect the tax treatment preferred.  
Insofar as the tax implications of these products depends upon the 
taxpayer's choice of terminology, thereby giving taxpayers the right to 
choose their desired tax treatment, current law violates the IRS’s asserted 
neutrality principle.  Under the circumstances, it would makes sense for 
the IRS to conform the tax treatment of caps and floors to the tax 
treatment of options, in recognition of the economic resemblance of a cap 
or floor contract to a series of option contracts
E. Assessing Credit Default Swaps
Like other trigger options, credit default swaps are simply options 
that are subject to an explicitly-stated contingency.  Aside from the trigger 
feature, they economically resemble conventional options in every respect. 
Like a conventional option, the buyer of protection pays to the seller a 
regular premium, or series of premiums, which are specified at the 
beginning of the transaction.  If no Credit Event, such as default, occurs 
during the life of the contract, these premium payments are the only cash 
flows, and the contract expires worthless.  Should there be a credit event, 
the protection seller makes a payment to the protection buyer based on the 
decline in value of the underlying property.  If the contract pays off, the 
protection buyer stops paying the periodic premiums.   
Like conventional options, the contract may be physically settled 
or cash settled.  A CDS may be cash-settled, with a payment based on the 
difference between the principal amount of the reference obligation and its 
post-credit event fair market value.  Alternatively, in some cases, the 
buyer may be permitted to deliver the reference security to the seller in 
exchange for the full par value amount.  Either way, the protection buyer 
is not required to own the reference obligation.  The protection buyer is 
able to deliver any qualifying loan or bond issued by the reference entity, 
typically one ranked pari passu, in return for a full par payment.  
Swaps by their nature contemplate a series of mutual exchanges of 
cash flows between two contracting parties.  In fact, one of the underlying 
themes of the notional principal contract regulations is to ensure that the 
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corresponding cash flows are appropriately matched to one another.    
Unlike traditional swaps, credit default swaps have no reciprocal cash 
flows.  One side makes regular periodic payments, generally fixed 
payments, and the other side either pays nothing over the life of the 
contract, or else it makes a single payment at termination that is liable to 
substantially exceed the amounts cumulatively paid by the other side.  If 
the contract does pay off, which tends to happen only rarely, it 
automatically terminates, and no further payments are due from either 
side. In sum, the contract either pays off, or else it expires worthless, 
which is the classic economic profile of an option.  A manifestly 
asymmetrical contract, credit default swaps bears no substantive 
resemblance to a financial swap and accordingly, they should be treated 
exclusively as options for tax purposes.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to identify what elements are really 
necessary to cause an economic arrangement to be treated as an option for 
federal income tax purposes.  Based on a review of the case law, a contract 
qualifies as an option if it includes an undertaking by one party at the 
inception of the contract to make a guaranteed non-refundable payment to 
the other --ordinarily paid upfront -- that is a fraction of the contract price, 
and whose payment relieves the payor of any further liability if it should 
be unable or unwilling to perform its end of the contract.  
Applying this definition of what constitutes an option, it is possible 
to address all of the ancillary questions set forth in the Introduction to this 
paper.  While it is economically essential for a premium to be paid in 
exchange for an option, it is not necessary for the premium to be paid 
upfront. That means that an option is still an option if the premium is 
payable on the exercise date, rather than when the contract is executed.  
The payment need not be described as a premium, but it must be non-
refundable and constitute only a fraction of the total potential contract 
liability.  
There is no underlying property requirement for a product to meet 
the definition of an option, so a non-property based option may still 
qualify as a bona fide option for tax purposes. For that reason, catastrophe 
options, weather derivatives, economic derivatives, mortgage pre-payment 
derivatives and economic derivatives are all properly described as options 
for tax purposes.  Non-property-based options can be distinguished from
wagers insofar as the term wager is generally used to describe bets made 
in the context of games, sports events and contests, rather than business 
settings. All of the aforementioned derivatives are furnished in a typical 
business setting.
2006                                          THE OPTION CONUNDRUM 72
72
If an option contract is subject to a contingency, it should still be 
classified as an option.  The existence of a contingency does not obviate 
the essential nature of an option contract as an option; in fact, it is an 
essential characteristic of an option for it to be premised on either an 
explicit or implicit contingency.  Options that have explicitly-stated
contingencies are described herein as trigger options, because exercise is 
triggered by the happening of the specified contingency.  The most 
prevalent example of a pure trigger option is a credit default swap.
The option definition developed in the first part of this paper 
presupposes, as is normally true for physically settled options, that the 
option holder would be required to make an additional payment to the 
option seller on the exercise date if she wishes to proceed with the 
underlying transaction.  Cash-settled options, however, typically dispense 
with the need for the option holder to pay any further amounts on the 
exercise date.  If and when a cash-settled option pays off, the parties’ 
respective payment obligations are netted, and the seller simply pays the 
difference between the market price and the strike price.  Nevertheless, 
this paper has also fashioned a clear definition for options that recognizes 
the distinctive economic nature of these instruments. In particular, a cash-
settled option is an asymmetrical contract that is a limited risk one-way bet 
which will either pay out from one side to the other, or else expire 
worthless. By this definition, caps and floors are incorrectly treated as 
notional principal contracts for tax purposes.  For the sake of consistency, 
these products should be recognized for their closer similarity to cash-
settled options and thereby taxed accordingly.
Issues of financial product classification may sometimes be the 
unavoidable result of the existence of two types of financial instruments 
which have similar economic effect but different legal forms.  However, 
as this paper has demonstrated, it is possible to differentiate between an 
option and a financial swap based on their differing economics.  In 
particular, an option is a limited risk, one-sided bet, whereas a swap 
entails a wholly symmetrical two-sided bet.   The tension inherent in 
classifying instruments as either options or notional principal contracts is 
strictly a matter of having inadequately drawn, overlapping regulatory 
definitions.  To resolve this potential conflict, the definition of an option 
can be clarified so as to make explicit the substantive differences between 
such contracts and notional principal contracts.123
123 Although the regulations give the IRS the right under Reg. Sec. 1.446-3(g)(1) to 
recharacterize all or part of a transaction or series of transactions if the effect is to avoid 
application of the notional principal contract rules, in the absence of a clear way to 
differentiate between options and notional principal contracts, it is not clear to what effect 
the IRS could apply this tool, which seems to presuppose the existence of standards for 
analysis.  
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If the IRS were to adopt a universal definition for an option along 
the lines just described, it would be in position to conclude that credit 
default swaps are properly classified as options for tax purposes.  In so 
doing, it would put to rest an important source of concern about the 
potential exposure of payments on these products to withholding taxes, 
which is currently a multi-million dollar concern to the financial products 
sector.  Having a clearly defined definition of what constitutes the 
essential nature of an option would also permit better differentiation 
between options and notional principal contracts, insofar as there are very 
real differences in the tax treatment between these two product 
classifications for timing and character purposes.  
In recent years, the IRS has emphasized the importance of the 
neutrality principle in the financial products area, i.e., requiring consistent 
treatment of different instruments with similar economic characteristics. 
The goal of neutrality rests on the notion that tax rules providing for 
differences in tax treatment which do not reflect real economic differences 
invariably lead to inappropriate tax consequences.  If taxpayers have the 
ability to enter into notional principal contracts with the same economic 
characteristics as options, and the two types of instruments do not receive 
the same tax treatment, tax-advantaged products can be developed to 
arbitrage the tax differences between the two instruments, which can lead 
to a whipsaw of the government. By the same token, not all taxpayers 
welcome the ability to pick and choose the proper classification of 
instruments.  A lack of guidance in the financial products sector tends to 
give rise to uncertainties that may discourage economically useful 
transactions.
The overlapping definitions of options and notional principal 
contracts create problems for the neutrality principle precisely because 
existing rules governing options and notional principal contracts are so 
inconsistent with one another.  Accordingly, it is important to decide, 
when developing rules for new financial products, which set of existing 
rules should be followed. In determining whether instruments should most 
appropriately be characterized as options or notional principal contracts, 
the IRS needs to provide clear guidelines that reflect the fundamental 
economic differences between these two products. 
There is nothing wrong with having significantly different tax 
results obtain for economically dissimilar financial instruments.   A clear 
definition of what constitutes an option would serve the IRS’s goal of 
minimizing cherry picking of character and timing results while ensuring a 
consistent application of the policy rationale for the different tax regimes.  
In this context, the neutrality principle can best be given consistent effect 
by properly differentiating between options and notional principal 
contracts based on their differing economic characteristics.  
